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The tax-exempt sector is at a watershed; the way it is perceived by 
the public is changing. Nonprofit organizations and their executives 
have succumbed to widely publicized recent scandals that one might 
expect from the business world or criminal enterprises.' Charitable 
1. One such scandal involved the United Way of America, a seminal development 
concerning fraud. SeeAramony v. United Way, 28 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(adjudicating various claims and counterclaims in a case that arose from the actions of 
William Aramony, the long-time president and chief executive officer .of the United Way of 
America, who for his own personal gain, engaged in criminal activities for which he was 
convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison), affd in part and rm'd in part, 86 F. Supp. 
2d 199 (2d Cir. 1999). Another scandal involved Dr. Lorraine E. Hale, the director of Hale 
House, a well-known charity that provides shelter for babies born to drug-addicted 
mothers, who was sentenced to probation after having admitted to stealing the charity's 
funds. John J. Goldman, Chan'ty Ex-ChiefAdmits to Theft, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2002, at A12. In 
that case, Hale, along with her husband, admitted to stealing approximately $700,000 from 
Hale House, id., which was found to not have had "a 'legally constituted' board of direc- 
tors," Terry Pristin, Co-Founder of Hale House is Dismissed with a Stinging Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 18, 2001, at B2. 
Other scandals have involved: the American Red Cross, David Barstow, A Nation Chal- 
lenged: The Chanties; In Congress, Harsh Words for Red Cross, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 7, 2001, at B1 
(summarizing the criticisms of members of Congress levied against the American Red 
Cross for the organization's decision to keep almost half of the charitable donations it 
received for September 11 victims in reserve); the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 
New Era Founder Indicted on 82 Counts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1996, at D2 (explaining that the 
founder of the foundation was indicted because he had allegedly bilked charities and phi- 
lanthropists out of approximately $350 million by promising them that their "investmentn 
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organizations serve a public purpose and the misuse of tax-exempt 
funds imposes an injustice upon the community.* As nonprofits in- 
creasingly resemble their for-profit counterparts or engage in inap- 
propriate or illegal activity, the halo effect of having tax-exempt status 
becomes tarnished. For-profit versions of traditional nonprofit activi- 
ties, such as health care and education, and conversions from the non- 
profit firm to the for-profit firm have blurred the difference between 
eleemosynary activity, with its rationale for special treatment, and for- 
would be doubled in six months by anonymous benefactors who did not exist); the Bishop 
Estate, JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 215-17 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the forced removal of the trustees of Hawaii's 
Bishop Estate, an affluent charitable trust, due to "financial impropriety, excessive com- 
pensation, and conflicts of interest"); Common Fund, Peter Truell, Investment Fund for Col- 
leges Says Trader Caused $128 Million Loss, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1995, § 1, at 1 (describing the 
approximately $128 million in losses caused by a rogue trader at a fund which oversaw 
nearly $20 billion of endowment for a consortium of educational institutions and in which 
the colleges were unaware of the risk and unable to limit such losses); Adelphi University, 
Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos (Bd. of Regents Feb. 5, 1997), at http:// 
www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2002) (recommending that the 
president of Adelphi University, who in 1995-96 was receiving a compensation package 
valued at approximately $837,113, a luxury Manhattan apartment, a Mercedes, and a lavish 
expense account all while the university was losing its student base, should be removed 
from office); Arizona Baptist Foundation, Randall Smith, Loss-Plagued Baptist Foundation of 
Arizona Undergoes Investigation by Regulators in State, MIALL ST. J . ,  Sept. 1,1999, at C1 (discuss- 
ing the loss of close to $100 million by the Baptist Foundation of Arizona through risky 
investments); and the Allegheny Health, Education, and Research Foundation, Scott Hens- 
ley, AHERFExecutives Arrested; Pa. Attorney General Says Three Stole Endowment Funds, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE, Mar. 20, 2002, at 2 (reviewing the allegations against the executives of the 
health foundation, which included using $52.4 million in foundation funds for such things 
as illegal political contributions and tickets to sporting events). 
In addition to insider actions, criminal elements will also occasionally use nonprofit 
organizations as vehicles for illegal activity. SeeTimothy Egan, After the Attach: The Profiteers; 
A Tragedy Spawns Charity Fraud and Pnce Gouging at the Gasoline Pumps, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 
2001, at A14 (reporting that phony telephone solicitors claiming to be collectors for Red 
Cross were calling individuals in the period after September 11); Judith Miller, U S .  Con- 
tends Muslim Charity is Tied to Hamas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, at A21 (reporting on the 
State Department's accusation that the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development 
is affiliated with a terrorist organization); Terry Pristin, Inquiries on Mortgage ~ e a i  Crimp 
Harlem's Realty Boom, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 26, 2000, § 1, at 1 (describing a scheme in which real 
estate speculators used nonprofit organizations to fraudulently obtain housing rehabilita- 
tion funds). 
2. This statement assumes that the tax exemptions and charitable deductions are gov- 
ernment subsidies to nonprofit organizations and their donors, or in tax parlance "'tax 
expenditures."' See 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2000) (defining tax expenditures as "revenue losses 
attributable to . . . exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income which provide a 
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liabilityn). In other words, a tax 
exemption represents an underground stream of funds out of the U.S. Treasury. See Regan 
v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (explaining that "[bloth tax 
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax 
system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of 
the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income."). 
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profit act i~i ty.~ Virtually all nonprofits have emulated for-profit firms 
in their efforts to generate earned i n ~ o m e . ~  Furthermore, these non- 
profit commercial activities may or may not compete unfairly with 
their for-profit counterparts, but they surely duplicate some products 
and have some impact on the marketplace in which they ~ o m p e t e . ~  
At the least, this nonprofit commercial activity lessens the distinctions 
between the two sectors and creates new pressures for probity and 
accountability. 
3. It has been argued that the creation of the nonprofit sector is motivated by certain 
limitations of the market economy. Garry MT. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilities of Nonprofit 
Mmgen: Suppwting Strategic Consolidation Through Law and Public Poliq, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1089, 1098 (2001). The nonprofit sector allows individuals to pool their resources to p r e  
duce collective goods which the majority does not approve of, and where government will 
not step in. LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 12-13 (2d ed. 
1999). Another justification for the nonprofit sector is: 
"contract failuren- that is, situations in which, owing either to the nature of the 
service in question or to the circumstances under which it is produced and con- 
sumed, ordinary contractual devices in themselves d o  not provide consumers with 
adequate means for policing the performance of producers. In such situations, 
the nonprofit form offers consumers the protection of another, broader "con- 
tractv-namely, the organization's commitment, through its nonprofit charter, to 
devote all of its income to the services it was formed to provide. 
Henry B. Hansmann, Refmming Nonprofit Cmporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 506-07 
(1981). 
Despite this specific need for the nonprofit sector, what if for-profit forms begin to 
compete with their nonprofit counterparts and there are no differences in delivery? With 
the enormous expansion of cable channels and the resulting programming needs, is there 
a need still for public television? Is the broadcast of a Rolling Stones concert on public 
television any different from a similar broadcast on MTV? The latter sometimes may have 
less intrusive advertisements than constant appeals for funds. M70uld not other stations 
pick up virtually all public television programming? Is the survival of the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting therefore the result of politics rather than need? See Ilvin Molotsky, 
One Tough Bird, After All; How Public Broadcasting Survived the Attacks of Conservatives, N.Y. 
TIMES, NOV. 27, 1997, at El  (describing the unsuccessful attempt by Congressional Republi- 
cans to shut down public broadcasting). For small business owners, the competition is 
more direct. In New York City, for-profit theaters such as the Quad Cinema compete 
against nonprofit theaters such as the Film Forum for the same independent films. Ed- 
ward Lewine, New Yorken & Co.; The War of the Film Wmlds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, § 14, at 
4. 
4. Lewine, supra note 3. 
5 .  Compare Henry B.  Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income 
Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 63435 (1989) (concluding that the Unrelated Business Income 
Tax (UBIT), I.R.C. § 511 (2000), should only be subjected to moderate reforms despite 
allegations by for-profit businessmen that it is causing them to have to unfairly compete 
with nonprofit firms), with Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income 
Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1038 (1982) (asserting that the UBIT causes nonprofits to 
narrow the breadth of their profitmaking activities and thus to impose losses on the com- 
petitive for-profit firms that are operating in the same sectors). 
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This Article focuses upon a persistent problem of the nonprofit 
sector-its lack of accountability to the p ~ b l i c . ~  Director, officer, and 
organizational responsibilities will be analyzed. Past and current a p  
proaches to secure accountability of charitable assets will be discussed, 
and a proposal for improving charitable accountability will be sug- 
gested through the creation of public-private charity commissions at 
the state level under the aegis of the attorney general. 
Like their for-profit counterparts, nonprofit organizations are 
governed by a variety of legal regimes. Organization and governance 
are primarily matters of state law. Most states have enacted distinct 
statutes for nonprofit organizations that address the mechanics of for- 
mation, operational issues, structural changes such as mergers and 
conversion to for-profit status, dissolution, the oversight role of the 
state attorney general, and most important for the purposes of this 
Article, fiduciary obligations and liabilities of officers and directors.' 
Nonprofit organizations have long been exempt from taxation at 
all levels of government.' Though there are over twenty categories of 
tax-exempt  organization^,^ the most desirable is Internal Revenue 
Code (I.R.C.) section 501 (c) (3) .lo Organizations that qualify as chari- 
6. Some scholars have raised a more basic issue-whether nonprofits are accountable 
to anyone, and if so to whom? See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic 
Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Fans ,  40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 
465-66 (1996). For a recent critical report on nonprofit accountability see U.S. GEN. AG 
COUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-02-526, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IMPROVEMENTS 
POSSIBLE I N  PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES (2002) [hereinafter GAO 
REPORT]. 
7. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-10840 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002) (providing Cali- 
fornia's statutes that regulate nonprofit corporations). 
8. See GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827, at 5 (1969) (noting 
that "[mlany privileges were granted to the charitable legacy which were denied to the 
private legacy"). 
9. See I.R.C. § 501 (c)-(d). 
10. Section 501 (c) (3) encompasses organizations: 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or interna- 
tional amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual. 
- 
I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3). No substantial part of a section 501 (c )  (3) organization's activities may 
consist of certain actions aimed at influencing legislation. Id The organization also can- 
not participate or intervene in "any political campaign on behalf o f .  . . any candidate for 
public office." Id These organizations are often termed "public benefit" nonprofits, as 
compared to "mutual benefit" nonprofits, such as trade associations, that focus upon their 
"members." See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Am xxiv-xxix (1988). 
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table under this section are eligible to receive tax deductible contribu- 
tions." The body of federal fiscal law is considerable and complex 
and has an increasing tendency to influence and shape state fiduciary 
principles.'* 
To be eligible to receive tax deductible contributions under sec- 
tion 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, nonprofit organizations 
can be formed as trusts, unincorporated associations, community 
chests, funds, foundations, or nonprofit  corporation^.'^ One of the 
odd aspects of nonprofit accountability is that the standard of ac- 
countability depends upon the form of organization chosen and 
whether the regulator is at the state or federal level.14 For some non- 
profit organizations the source of accountability lies in the law of 
trusts. For others the origin lies in corporate law. Within the corpus 
of trust or corporate law, the legal consequences may differ from 
other bodies in that organizational form.15 For instance, the benefi- 
ciaries of private trusts have standing to correct fiduciary breaches, 
but the beneficiaries of charitable trusts are typically the public and 
lack standing to sue.16 On the for-profit side, the demands of profit- 
ability, shareholders, capital markets, investment analysts, and looser 
standing requirements provide incentives for directors to perform as 
they should." The narrowness of standing in the nonprofit sector, 
however, restricts the number of potential sentries of nonprofit behav- 
ior and places accountability in the hands of understaffed 
regulators.'' 
11. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(l) (permitting deduction of charitable contributions); i d  
§ 170(c) (2) (B) (qualifying a gift to a § 501 (c) (3) corporation or other organization as a 
charitable contribution). Section 170(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code together with 
section 170(a) (1) permit taxpayers to deduct contributions to veterans organizations that 
qualify for tax exemption under section 501 (c) (19), but section 501 (c) (3) remains the 
most desirable category for other nonprofits. 
12. Apart from taxes, nonprofit organizations are subject to various other forms of reg- 
ulation ranging from antitrust to securities law. See Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of 
Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W .  RES. L. REV. 807, 
82425 (1989). 
13. I.R.C. 5 501 (c) (3). 
14. See generally Susan N .  Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: T m t  Law, Cuqm 
rate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U .  HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999) (noting the roles of state regulators, 
their federal counterparts, and shareholders in shareholder derivative suits). 
15. Id. at 595-96. 
16. See id. at 624 (observing that most states restrict standing in these cases to the state 
attorney general). 
17. Id. at 52526. 
18. Id. at 62324. 
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A. Charitable Trusts 
The existence of the charitable trust, as the oldest form of non- 
profit entity, predates the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 back to 
the fourteenth ~ e n t u r y . ' ~  "A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship 
with respect to property arising as a result of a manifestation of an 
intention to create it."" The trustee, as the person who holds the 
trust property is subjected "to equitable duties to deal with the prop- 
erty for a charitable purpose."*' Charitable trusts are distinct from 
private trusts. The object of charitable trusts is to benefit the commu- 
nity rather than private individuals. Charitable trust assets must be 
dedicated exclusively and irrevocably to the objectives of that trust.'* 
Charitable trusts are enforced by the attorney general and not the 
trust's benefi~iaries,'~ and are not subject to the rule against perpetu- 
ities, and are therefore of unlimited d~ra t ion . '~  
The charitable trust remains the predominant form of charitable 
organization in England,*' although it has a less consistent existence 
in the United States.26 Charitable trusts are appropriate for guarding 
property for charitable purposes and are often used for private foun- 
dations engaged exclusively in making grants.27 The charitable trust 
form provides: ease and swiftness of formation, administration, and 
maintenance compared to the corporate form, choice of longevity, 
and the option of perpetual control by the g r a n t ~ r . ' ~  In addition, a 
charitable trust may be less costly to maintain than a nonprofit 
c o r p o r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
19. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 321 (rev. 2d ed. 1992); see also BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS § 5.1, at 86 (7th ed. 1998) (noting that the Statute of Charitable Uses of 
1601 derived the definition of charitable purposes from English chancery law, as well as 
earlier civilizations and cultures). Exempt organizations such as churches existed far back 
into antiquity. 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959). 
21. Id. 
22. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 86. 
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 379 cmt. a. 
24. See 4A AUSTIN M'AKEW SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
§§ 348.1, 365 (4th ed. 1989). 
25. James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and a n  Agenda for 
R e f m ,  34 EMORY L.J. 617, 620 (1985) (citing MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS 
AND GOVERNMENT 18-27 (1965) ). 
26. See id. at 624-29 (finding a historical reluctance on the part of American courts, 
including the Supreme Court, to uphold the validity of charitable trusts). 
27. FISH~MAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 62. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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The mechanics of the charitable trust are governed by the chari- 
table trust instrument, which: "names the trustees[; provides the chari- 
table objective;] establishes policies for administration, distribution of 
assets and dissolution[;] names successor trustees or method of selec- 
tion[;] and states the duration of the The trustees are respon- 
sible for management of the charitable trust." The trustees "may be 
selected by the settlor or, in certain instances, judicially appointed, 
and may be self-perpetuating if the trust instrument so provides."32 
B. Nonprofit Corporations 
Nonprofit corporations are governed by a board of direct01-sS3' 
In contrast to the charitable trust under which fiduciary responsibili- 
ties are governed under the restrictive and demanding principles of 
trust law, nonprofit corporate law is primarily influenced by the more 
lenient standards of business corporate law.34 While the differences 
provide flexibility for nonprofit corporations and their boards, they 
also create problems, because the boundaries between appropriate 
and impermissible behavior are not always clear. Nor are the statutes 
at the state or federal levels models of clarity. 
The nonprofit corporation is the predominant form of exempt 
organization in the United  state^.'^ The nondistribution constraint of 
the nonprofit corporation distinguishes it from the business corpora- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  While this constraint does not preclude nonprofit corpora- 
tions from earning a profit, it does prevent them from distributing any 
net profits to their  member^,^' who are tantamount to corporate 
30. Id. Charitable trusts can be indefinite in duration unless the grantor has reserved a 
right of revocation or power to modify. 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 24, 367. 
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. a (1959); Harry G. Henn & Michael 
George Pfeifer, ~Vonprofit Groups: Factors Influencing Choice of Fonn, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
181, 202 (1975). 
32. Henn & Pfeifer, supra note 31, at 202 (footnotes omitted). 
33. FISH.MA~Y & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 64. 
34. See id. (noting the lower standard of care owed by nonprofit corporation directors 
as compared to charitable trustees). 
35. See Carolyn C. Clark & Glenn M. Troost, Fonning a Foundation: Trust us. Coqmation, 
PROB. & PROP., May/June 1989, at 32 (noting that "the corporate form is used most fre- 
quently when creating a museum, hospital, school or other charitable organization which 
will be open to the public on a regular basis"). 
36. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 508 (McKinney 1997); REVISED MODEL NON- 
PROFIT CORP. ACT 5 13.01 (1988). Consumer cooperatives, a specialized breed of nonprofit 
organizations, do permit dividend distributions t o  their members. Cooperative corpora- 
tion statutes typically limit the purposes for which such corporations can be formed to 
ventures such as agricultural, housing, or medical activities. Hansmann, supra note 3, at 
595-96. 
37. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 5 508; REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT 
§ 13.01 cmt. 
Heinonline - -  62 Md. L. Rev. 225 2003 
shareholders in the nonprofit context. The nonprofit corporate form 
is advantageous in that its governing statutes are analogous to state 
corporate law.38 This similarity provides a nonprofit corporation's le- 
gal counsel with a familial body of comparable case law that can be 
applied to the nonprofit context. 
The charitable corporation, compared to the unincorporated as- 
sociation3' or charitable trust, must adhere to more formalities in its 
creation and dissolution, but greater flexibility exists in its internal 
governance, making the charitable corporation more responsive to 
circumstantial changes such as the resignation or death of a director. 
A corporation can simply hold new elections while a change of a char- 
itable trust organization's trustee may require application to a court.40 
The charitable corporation can amend corporate governing instru- 
ments with greater fle~ibility.~' Similar to other corporate entities, 
the charitable corporation can sue and be sued, contract, and hold 
- 
property in its own name. It has an indefinite existence, with the 
board of directors acting as its centralized management.42 However, 
nonprofit corporation directors are held to a lower standard of care 
than charitable trustees;43 directors benefit from limited liability.44 
38. FISHMAN & SCHWXU, supra note 1, at 63. 
39. Nonprofit tax-exempt organizations also can be unincorporated associations, an 
informal form of organization that involves "nothing more than two or more persons or- 
ganized for a common purpose." Id. at 61. Relatively few nonprofits have adopted this 
form of organization. 
40. Compare REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.03 (1999), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 107 (1959). 
41. However, corporate flexibility is not unlimited. In Alco Gravure, Inc. v .  Knapp Foun- 
dation, the court held that directors of a not-for-profit corporation did not have unlimited 
power of amendment as to how assets were to be administered or to effectuate a transfer of 
assets on dissolution of a nonprofit corporation where amendment would have changed 
the purpose for which funds were given to the corporation. 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 
1985). Many features of corporate flexibility, such as the ability to delegate to officers and 
agents and amending rules of procedure, can be incorporated in a trust by "carefully 
drafted powers in the governing trust instrument." See Clark & Troost, supra note 35, at 32. 
42. See William T. Allen e t  al., Function over F m :  A Reassessment of Standards of Review in 
Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1288 (2001) (explaining that "the central 
features of the corporate form-fictitious entity status and limited liability of investors, 
indefinite existence, centralized management, and transferable share interests-make that 
form an extremely efficient way to aggregate the large pools of capital that are essential to 
finance large scale enterprisen). 
43. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (stating that "a trustee is uniformly held to a higher 
standard of care and will be held liable for simple negligence, while a director must often 
have committed 'gross negligence' "). 
44. See Gary, supra note 14, at 606 (providing that "in addition to the protection for 
directors provided by the business judgment rule, many states permit corporations to in- 
clude a provision in the articles of incorporation limiting director liability under the duty 
of care"). 
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Nevertheless, no matter what the form of organization, a primary con- 
cern of regulators at the state and federal levels is with the behavior of 
its f id~ciar ies .~~ 
A. The Fiducialy Principle 
Directors and officers of nonprofit organizations are f id~ciar ies .~~ 
A fiduciary is one who acts for the benefit of a n ~ t h e r . ~ '  A fiduciary 
relationship involves a duty on the part of the fiduciary to act for the 
benefit of the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope 
of the re la t i~nship .~~ The "entrustor" in a fiduciary relationship is de- 
pendent upon the fid~ciary,~' and the fiduciary may not profit at the 
expense of the beneficiary unless she makes full disclosure of all cir- 
cumstances surrounding a tran~action.~' In a real sense, a fiduciary is 
her brother's keeper. 
A fiduciary relationship is a description of an affiliation, but not 
an absolute test as to whether fiduciary obligations will be demanded. 
Relationships in which fiduciary obligations have been imposed pos- 
sess three general characteristics: (1) the fiduciary has the "scope for 
the exercise of some discretion or power; (2) that power or discretion 
can be exercised unilaterally so as to effect [sic] the beneficiary's legal 
or practical interests; and, (3) a peculiar vulnerability to the exercise 
of that discretion or power."" 
45. Allen et al., supra note 42, at 1289-90. 
46. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiducialy Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Para- 
doxes, Problems, and Proposed R e f m ,  23 J .  CORP. L. 631, 632 (1998). 
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990) (defining fiduciary as "[a] person hav- 
ing [a] duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters 
connected with such undertaking"). 
48. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) 
(describing the nature of a fiduciary relationship within a trust). The fiduciary cannot 
profit at the expense of the beneficiary and must disclose all relevant information or cir- 
cumstances or the transaction can be set aside. BOCERT & BOGERT, supra note 19, § 1, at 5 
(stating "[a] fiduciary relation is one in which the law demands of one party an unusually 
high standard of ethical or moral conduct with reference to another"). 
49. Tamar Frankel, Fiducialy Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983). 
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (explaining that "if the fiduciary enters 
into a transaction with the other and fails to make full disclosure of all relevant circum- 
stances known to the fiduciary, or if the transaction is unfair to the other, the transaction 
can be set aside by the other"). 
51. Hodgkinson v. Simms, [I9941 S.C.R. 377, 379. 
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1. Twt Fiduciam'es.-The word "fiduciary" is frequently used in 
the context of a trustee of a trust or one who holds anything in trust.j2 
In the trust setting, a fiduciary or one with a fiduciary obligation has a 
confidential relationship with another and is under a duty to act for 
the benefit of another as to matters within the scope of the fiduciary 
r e l a t i~nsh ip .~~  The fiduciary cannot profit at the expense of another, 
whether a beneficiary or a charity.j4 When a fiduciary enters into a 
transaction with another and fails to fully disclose all pertinent cir- 
cumstances, or if the transaction is unfair to the other, a court can set 
the transaction aside.j5 
The fiduciary obligation originated in equity, which granted re- 
lief "in numerous situations involving one person's abuse of confi- 
dence reposed in him by another."j6 Breach of trust comprised one 
of equity's traditional jurisdictional  realm^.^' Though the word "fidu- 
ciary" is commonly associated with the law of trusts, it has much 
broader use today.j8 The word "fiduciary" did not enter the English 
law reports until the mid-nineteenth century and was descriptive of 
relationships that resembled that between a trustee and beneficiary.j9 
"Fiduciary" came from the Latin term "fiducia" meaning trust, and 
replaced "trust," which came to have a more technical meaning.60 
This meant that other situations, such as confidences, which were sim- 
ilar in nature required another term, and "fiduciary," an inadequate 
word itself, began to be used to encapsulate an indefinite series of 
relati~nships.~' Since that time, there has been an enormous expan- 
52. "A trust. . . is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of 
a manifestation of an intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who 
holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of [another]." RESTATE- 
MENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2. 
53. Id. cmt. b. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Deborah A. DeMott, Bqond Metaphor: An Ana4si.s of Fiducia~y Obligation, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 880. 
57. L. S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 20 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69 (1962). 
58. Originally, the concept was used for matters of confidence, which covers more than 
trusts whereby A had "confidence reposed in him by B not only where B had entrusted A 
with property to hold and deal with on behalf of himself or others." I d  (emphasis added). 
Confidence could also be reposed where B is dependent on A's advice because A was a 
trusted servant or  friend or a person of dominant character or position. Id. "[Mlany of 
these matters of confidence were naturally called 'trusts' whether there was any strict trust 
of property or  not." Id. at 70. In time, this looseness of phrasing gave rise to concrete 
rules. Id. 
59. Id. at 71-72. 
60. Id. at 72. 
61. Id. 70-73 (stating "[tlhe word 'fiducialy,' we find, is not definitive of a single class of 
relationships to which a fixed set of rules and principles apply"). 
Heinonline - -  62 Md. L. Rev. 228 2003 
sion of fiduciary law into other areas of law and contexts reflecting 
basic changes in society.62 
A fiduciary may be entrusted with a power that creates a risk that 
she will misuse the property or assets of the entrustor to the detriment 
of the benef i~ ia ry .~~  When a fiduciary does not misuse her power, the 
obligation goes against normal human behavior, because the fiduciary 
cannot act for herself or advance her own interest but can only fur- 
ther the interest of another.'* There have been several theoretical 
justifications for the fiduciary ob1igation:'"l) voluntary assumption 
theory, whereby the fiduciary commits to act in another person's in- 
te re~t ; '~  (2) entrusting theory, whereby the entrustor is dependent on 
the fid~ciary;'~ (3) unjust enrichment theory, which describes the re- 
lief granted when a fiduciary has violated her and (4) depen- 
dency theory, in which the fiduciary relation looks to the relative 
positions of the parties and recognizes the beneficiary is at the mercy 
of the fiduciary." Whatever the justification, a fiduciary obligation is 
a device that limits the discretion of the fiduciary to act in her own 
interest in a range of situations to which the law will harshly re- 
 pond.^' Once a fiduciary obligation is found, the law has imposed 
the highest standards of duty to assure that the beneficiaries' interests 
are kept in the forefront.'l 
There are generally three main types of fiduciary breach: (1) of 
the duty of loyalty involving a misappropriation of an asset or some- 
62. Frankel, supra note 49, at 795-98; see also Ernest J. M'einrib, The Aducialy Obligation, 
25 U .  TORONTO L.J. 1, 1 (1975) (noting that "[iln the [last] two and a half centuries, the 
notion of the high standard incumbent on a fiduciary has spread from its original home- 
land in the law of trusts and has subjected a diverse variety of entrepreneurs-directors, 
partners, agents, employees-to its colonizing swayn). 
63. Frankel, supra note 49, at 809. 
64. Id. (explaining that "[tlhe power that the fiduciary obtains is originally vested in 
someone else, and is delegated to the fiduciary not for his own use, but solely for the 
purpose of facilitating the performances of his functions"). 
65. See generally DeMott, supra note 56, at 90815 (discussing theoretical justifications 
for fiduciary obligation). 
66. Austin Mr. Scott, The Fiducialy Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949). 
67. Frankel, supra note 49, at 800-01 (stating that "[bly definition, the entrustor be- 
comes dependent because he must rely on the fiduciary for a particular service"). 
68. Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiducialy 's Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW. Q. REV. 
472,474 (1968). If a fiduciary is in breach of a duty of loyalty he must disgorge any benefit 
gained. 
69. Weinrib, supra note 62, at 67. 
70. DeMott, supra note 56, at 915. 
71. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiducialy Relationship: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequaces, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1991) (explaining that the 
duty of loyalty and the duty of care protect against misappropriation and negligent man- 
agement of funds). 
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thing of value,72 (2) of the duty of care consisting of the negligent 
attention to the beneficiaries' needs or estate,73 and (3) of the duty of 
obedience, requiring compliance with the expressed purposes of the 
~rganiza t ion .~~ 
Fiduciaries are also subject to common law duties, statutory man- 
dates, and equitable rules or principles.75 Thus, a fiduciary must col- 
lect and preserve property, but must not commingle it with her own 
assets; must not take incongruous or contrary actions despite instruc- 
tions; and must keep beneficiaries informed.76 The most fundamen- 
tal duty of a charitable trustee or corporate fiduciary is loyalty to the 
beneficiary. The reasoning for the loyalty rule is that a person cannot 
serve two masters and act fairly toward both. The fiduciary's concern 
must be with the interest of the beneficiary whether it is a distinct 
individual or an inchoate body such as the Because of the 
indefiniteness of the beneficiary class, the loyalty rule is designed to 
deter the fiduciary from the temptation of engaging in opportunistic 
beha~ior.~' An action in good faith is not an excuse.79 
The legal rules of trust fiduciaries stringently have prohibited the 
fiduciary from misappropriating the beneficiary's property and have 
held her liable for the mismanagement of the asset." If a fiduciary 
has profited at the expense of the beneficiary or has advanced her 
72. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted). Judge Car- 
dozo described the fiduciary's duty of loyalty as follows: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's 
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to some- 
thing stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honestly alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to 
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncom- 
promising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to 
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particu- 
lar exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a 
level higher than that trodden by the crowd. 
Id. 
73. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 71, at 1047. 
74. Michelle Estrin Gilman, "Charitable Choice" and the Accountability Chalhge: Recon- 
ciling the Need fm Regulation with the First A m a d m a t  Religion Clawes, 55 VAND. L. REV. 799, 
828 (2002). 
75. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 19, §§ 541-544. 
76. Id. § 541. 
77. See Naomi Ono, Boards of Directors Under Fire: An Examination of NonproJit Board Duties 
in the Health Care Environment, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 111 n.23 (1998) (stating that 
boards of directors have similar duties "whether the beneficiaries are the shareholders or 
the public-at-large") . 
78. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 19, § 543. 
79. Id. (stating "[glood faith on the part of the trustee is not a defense against a claim 
of disloyalty"). 
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 198 (1959). 
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own interests, the gain will be treated as unjust enrichment and equity 
will demand that it be disgorged." Upon a breach of the duty of care 
the fiduciary will be guilty of simple negligence. Primarily, trust law is 
concerned with preventing conflicts of interest by prohibiting, limit- 
ing, or supervising selfdealing and by placing the burden of proof 
upon the fiduciary to just* her actions.'' 
2. Corporate Fiduciaries.-Trustees of charitable trusts are gener- 
ally held to stricter fiduciary norms of oversight than directors of non- 
profit  corporation^.^" Thus, the degree of legal accountability will 
depend upon the choice of form. If a nonprofit organization is incor- 
porated, a board of directors exercises the corporate powers and di- 
rects the management in its activitie~.'~ The governance structures of 
nonprofit organizations resemble their profit seeking counterparts, as 
do the fiduciary standards of behavior.85 Fiduciary corporate rules are 
much more flexible and relaxed than their trust analogs.86 
The mandates of the legal rules mask a problem: they are difficult 
to apply in concrete situations. While some commentators have sug- 
gested that the fiduciary principle is "a standard form penalty clause," 
a default or an "off-the-rack rule that reduces transaction and en- 
forcement costs,s7 courts are not loath to find a fiduciary relationship 
despite the intentions of the parties and, if there is a breach, they will 
impose a constructive trust.88 
Once a person assumes a fiduciary obligation, a series of moral 
demands are placed upon her including "[lloyalty, fidelity, faith, and 
honor."89 One of the problems for the fiduciary is that these stan- 
dards are ambiguous, largely self-enforcing, and hardly reflective of 
normal human behavior. Often, the generality of fiduciary norms 
makes their application In this area, as in so many others, 
81. Jones, supra note 68, at 472-74. 
82. Frankel, supra note 49, at 82425. 
83.  FISHMAN MAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1 ,  at 64. Although there are differing structures 
for trustees of charitable trusts and directors of nonprofit cbrporations, the terms "trusteen 
and "director" often are used interchangeably. 
84. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1988). 
85. See Gary, supra note 14, at 61 1-12 (noting that the Revised Model Nonprofit Corpe 
ration Act uses corporate style fiduciary duties for nonprofit corporation directors). 
86. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 63. 
87. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE 
L.J. 698, 702-03 (1982). 
88. P.D. Finn, The Fiducialy Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 1, 23, 54 (T.G. 
Youdan ed., 1989). 
89. Frankel, supra note 49, at 829-30. 
90. See DeMott, supra note 56, at 879 (discussing how courts have historically relied on 
past cases in determining whether a fiduciary obligation exists in a particular case). 
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individuals with fiduciary responsibilities may deceive themselves into 
believing that they are upholding standards when in fact they are not. 
Sometimes they are simply following custom or are otherwise ignorant 
of the rules or of changes in fiduciary standards. Fiduciaries may 
cheat and act with proven dishonesty. As often, the fiduciary may not 
benefit, but the beneficiary is harmed through neglect. The fiduciary 
may have a pure heart and an empty head, being foolish but honest.g1 
B. The Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience 
The duty of care applies to the standard of conduct required of 
directors in the discharge of their fiduciary duties.92 It mandates that 
directors exercise their responsibilities "in good faith" and with a cer- 
tain degree of diligence, attention, care, and skill.g3 Generally, a di- 
rector can neglect her duty of care by failing to supervise the 
corporate entity, or even if the director is unprejudiced, independent, 
and acting in good faith, by neglecting to make an informed decision 
about a matter that comes before the board for action.94 
The duty of care and a complementary principle, the business 
judgment rule, relate to the process of decision making. If a director 
acts in good faith, with the requisite degree of care, and within her 
authority, the director will not be liable for a decision, even if it proves 
disastrous to the organi~ation.~~ Thus, the duty of care is concerned 
with the manner in which directors exercise their responsibilities, 
rather than a decision's correctness or benefit to the organization. 
The duty of care has two components. The first is a process issue: 
did the directors act with insufficient care in reaching their deci- 
~ i o n ? ' ~  The second question raises a substantive inquiry: was the deci- 
sion so rash as to warrant being set aside or imposing personal liability 
91. Cf: Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Dzicourse i n  the Corporate Law Literature, 52 
CEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 590 (1984) (stating in reference to the corporate sector that "it 
may well be that the most important contemporary problem concerning managerial ac- 
countability is not the manager who consciously violates his trust, but the manager who 
does his best but whose best is not good enough"). 
92. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. A m  § 8.30 (1988). 
93. Id. 5 8.30(a)(l)-(2); see also CAL. CORP. CODE 5 5231(a) (West 1990); N.Y. NOT-FOR- 
PROFIT CORP. LAW 5 717(a) (McKinney 1997). 
94. James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots i n  the 
Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to For-Profit Status, 23 J. CORP. L. 701, 734 
(1998). 
95. James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Co-rporations, 7 PACE L. 
REV. 389, 399 (1987). 
96. See id. at 400. The inquiry into whether a director violated her duty of care presup 
poses that the director made a reasonable inquiry and an informed decision. Id. 
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on the  director^?'^ If the response to each component is negative, the 
director will be protected by the business judgment rule, or more ac- 
curately in a nonprofit setting, the best judgment rule.98 The business 
judgment rule provides that directors shall not be liable for harm to 
the corporation for exercising their judgment so long as they exercise 
care.gg This judgmental safe harbor only applies in the absence of 
fraud, illegality, or some disabling conflict of interest."' 
The standard for a charitable trustee's duty of care once was as 
rigid as that of the private trust.lO' Under the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, " [t] he trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administer- 
ing the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary pru- 
dence would exercise with his own property."lo2 The powers of 
delegation were quite limited.'03 Commencing with the Uniform 
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA) approved in 1972 by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,lo4 
the standard of care became more flexible and applied similar stan- 
dards to trustees of charitable trusts and nonprofit  corporation^.'^^ 
Furthermore, UMIFA eased restrictions on investments under trust 
law by adopting a business judgment approach for director and trus- 
tee decisions in connection with investment decisions.'06 UMIFA's ap- 
proval has been followed by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act,'07 the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts,'o8 and the Uniform Trust Code.'Og The 
Restatement has seemingly joined the duties of care of the trustees of a 
97. See id. A director has not violated the duty of care in a non-selfdealing transaction 
if the director could have rationally believed that the transaction was in the best interest of 
the corporation. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Govern- 
ance Praject: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 610-1 1 (1984). 
100. Id. 
101. Gary, supra note 14, at 597. 
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). This was an obviously flawed stan- 
dard as human nature suggests few people would exercise the same care for another as 
they would with their own property. See Harden v. Parson, 28 Eng. Rep. 639, 641 (Ch. 
1758). 
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (requiring a trustee not to delegate 
responsibilities that he could reasonably perform himself). 
104. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, 7A pt. I1 U.L.A. 475 (1999). 
105. See id. § 6, 7A pt. I1 U.L.A. 500 (adopting the ordinary business care standard as the 
standard of conduct). The UMIFA applies to charitable organizations, regardless of 
whether the organization is incorporated. Id. § 1 ( I ) ,  7A pt. I1 U.L.A. 484. 
106. Id. § 6, 7A pt. I1 U.L.A. 500; see also Gary, supra note 14, at 601 (discussing UMIFA's 
investment restrictions). 
107. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 286 (2000). 
108. RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TRUSTS (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). 
109. UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. § 99 (Supp. 2002). 
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charitable trust and a director of a nonprofit corp~ration."~ Section 
227 states that a trustee should exercise such care and skill in adminis- 
tering the trust as an investor of ordinary prudence would exercise"' 
language similar to the corporate duty of care.lI2 
There have been differing degrees of care expected from non- 
profit directors.l13 Since most directors are unpaid and serve out of a 
sense of civic duty, there is a reluctance to impose financial liabilities 
upon them."4 One cannot make the position of director so legally 
burdensome that people will notjoin boards or will refuse to allow the 
organization to undertake risks. A tension exists between a desire to 
encourage competent and energetic people to serve on boards and 
society's need to assure that directors are accountable for the activities 
of public benefit nonprofits, whose rationale is to serve the commu- 
nity. Today, the dominant nonprofit standard of care is that applied 
to corporate directors.l15 A director of a nonprofit is supposed to dis- 
charge her duties "(1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar cir- 
cumstances; and (3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to 
be in the best interests of the corporation."'16 
Differing standards of the duty of loyalty have remained. Under 
the law of trusts the duty of loyalty is "perhaps the most fundamental 
duty of the tr~stee."'~' The rule against conflicts of interest between 
the trustee and the trust is absolute and a court may require any im- 
proper transactions to be u n ~ o u n d . " ~  The standard of loyalty for di- 
rectors of charitable corporations draws upon business corporate law. 
Directors must be loyal to the corporations on whose board they 
110. See RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR ULE § 227 (proposing a 
m t  investment standard). 
111. Id. 
112. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1)-(3) (1988). 
113. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1015 (D.D.C. 1974) (explaining that in many jurisdictions a director 
must have exhibited gross negligence to be liable for negligent mismanagement of invest- 
ments); Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (stat- 
ing that a director's standard of care in executing a trust is that of a prudent man); George 
Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600, 604-05 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (finding 
that- the joiner who endowed the foundation was not liable for lost foundation funds, 
which the court understood were lost through either ignorance or careless actions), over- 
ruled en banc by Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 
1964). 
114. Fishman, supra note 95, at 407. 
115. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 176. 
116. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(l)-(3). 
117. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (amended 2001), 7C U.L.A. 101 (Supp. 2002). 
118. Gary, supra note 14, at 59899. 
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serve."g This requires them to act in a way that does not harm the 
corporation and places the corporation's needs ahead of their own 
interests."' The mandate of loyalty further requires directors to avoid 
using their positions to obtain personal benefits or advantages, which 
more properly belong to the c~rpora t ion . '~~  The fact that a director 
has an interest in a transaction is less important than whether the un- 
dertaking was fair to the corporation when the decision was made, 
and whether the decision was reached after full disclosure in an im- 
partial board envi r~nment . '~~  Directors should make decisions objec- 
tively, refrain from participating in decisions that benefit themselves, 
and obtain approval from the corporation's board if a relationship 
exists which might impair the director's objectivity.lZ3 If a director 
receives more favorable financial benefits than he could gain in the 
open market or enjoys priority over market competitors, a conflict of 
interest results. 
Conflicts of interest, divided loyalties, and transactions between 
directors, officers, and charitable corporations commonly occur in the 
nonprofit sector.lZ4 "Breaches of loyalty are not only much easier to 
identlfy than breaches of care, they are much more pre~alent."'~' In- 
terested nonprofit transactions parallel business corporate practices 
and are bounded only by human ingenuity. Some frequent forms of 
interested transactions include: the use of an organization's property 
or assets on a more favorable basis than available to ~u t s ide r s ; '~~  the 
taking of an opportunity that rightfully belongs to the c~rporation;'~' 
the use of material nonpublic organizational information or posi- 
tion;'" and insider advantages and corporate wa~te ."~ 
119. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT. § 8.30 cmt. 4. 
120. See id. § 8.30-.33 (setting forth general and specific aspects of a director's duty of 
loyalty). 
121. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 190. 
122. Id. 
123. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02 (1994). 
124. See supra note 1 (providing examples of recent scandals involving charities). 
125. Fishman, supra note 95, at 42324. 
126. See Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1078 (6th Cir. 1974) (ex- 
plaining that a group of doctors were given preferential leases for office space); Gilbert M. 
Gaul & Neil1 A. Borowski, Warehouses of Wealth: The Tax-Free Economy, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 
22, 1993, at A1 (chronicling salaries and perks given to nonprofit directors including low 
interest and no interest loans). 
127. See Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Hanis, 661 A.2d 1146, 1146-47 (Me. 1995) 
(discussing the actions of a golf club president who purchased adjoining land for herself 
without notifying the board ;f directdrs). - 
128. See Doreen Carvajal, Ailq Building is Designed by Relative of Board Chief; N.Y. TIMES, 
May 15,2001, at E l  (reporting on a commission to construct a building for a dance troupe 
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Interested transactions are often a necessity for a nonprofit or- 
ganization. They may provide access to resources unavailable in the 
marketplace. The financial status of the nonprofit organization may 
be so poor that credit, supplies, or services are unattainable. A loan of 
money, goods, or services may be obtainable only from a director, who 
is concerned with the organization's welfare. In other contexts, the 
interested transaction may be unethical or illegal and, therefore, viola- 
tive of the director'% duty of loyalty to the corporation and to the 
public. 
When evaluating a conflict of interest, one should focus upon the 
procedural aspects of the transaction and upon its substantive nature. 
The procedural aspects relate to the way the transaction is approved 
by the board of directors on behalf of the corporation. Procedural 
inquiries include asking whether corporate procedures for interested 
transactions have been established and were they followed in the par- 
ticular transaction; was the board environment impartial and objective 
at the time the decision was made; was information relating to the 
transaction fully disclosed by the interested parties to the relevant 
decisionmakers; and was the interest of the involved director fully dis- 
closed to the relevant decisionmakers. Substantive factors in conflict 
of interest transactions include the fairness of the transaction to the 
corporation in terms of the consideration the corporation received, 
the frequency of interested transactions between directors and the or- 
ganization, and the overall financial status of the organization in rela- 
tion to the particular transaction. 
The permissibility of an interested transaction depends upon its 
context and the director's motivations. A transaction which may be 
perfectly proper in one context may be inappropriate under slightly 
different circumstances. For instance, nonprofit organizations have 
been formed as successors to proprietary corporations, typically 
schools, hospitals, and nursing homes. The shareholderdirectors of 
the proprietary organization become the directors of the nonprofit 
corporation. If the successor organization pays the proprietary organ- 
that had been awarded to the son-in-law of the troupe's chairwoman without any competi- 
tion or public notice). 
129. See Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 408 N.E.2d 243, 244 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (alleg- 
ing that the directors of a museum mismanaged it and improperly sold a painting); Mile-0- 
Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 210 N.E.2d 12, 16 (111. App. Ct. 1965) (finding that the 
former president of the club breached his fiduciary obligation by purchasing property that 
the corporation had desired to purchase); Kirtley v. McClelland, 562 N.E.2d 27,3336 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1990) (examining and upholding the trial court's decision that the director of an 
owner's association breached his fiduciary duty by buying and operating a cable system on 
his own at the exclusion of the owner's association). 
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ization a fair rental value for its property or reasonable compensation 
for the proprietary's assets, the interested transaction should be per- 
mitted. If the nonprofit successor serves the directors' own interests, 
assumes for-profit liabilities in a bailout context, or overpays the rental 
costs or purchases the assets at an inflated price, the transaction is 
impermissible self-dealing."' 
Another responsibility of directors is to abide by the organiza- 
tion's purposes as expressed in the articles of association or certificate 
of incorporation.'" This responsibility, termed the duty of obedi- 
ence, resembles the trustee's duty to administer a trust in a manner 
faithful to the wishes of the creator.I3* Unless allowed by the law, non- 
profit directors may not deviate in any substantial way from the duty to 
fulfill the particular purposes for which the organization was cre- 
ated.'33 The duty of obedience mandates that the board refrain from 
transactions and activities that are ultra vires, that is, beyond the corpo- 
ration's powers and purposes as expressed in its certificate of incorpo- 
ration.134 Though the ultra vires doctrine has been emasculated in 
corporate law,13' a director may still be subject to suit if the corpora- 
tion has entered into or completed an ultra vires transaction.'" Thus, 
the director must follow the purposes and powers expressed in the 
governing legal documents.13' 
Beyond obeying the organizational documents, a nonprofit cor- 
poration and its directors and officers have the responsibility to 
130. Fishman, supra note 95, at 42425. 
131. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, s u p a  note 1, at 230. 
132. See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 24, § 164.1. 
133. DANIEL . KURTZ, BOARD LIABILI~ 84-85 (1988). 
134. Gilman, supra note 74, at 828. 
135. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.04 cmt. (1988) (declaring that section 
3.04's purpose is to eliminate the ultra vires doctrine). 
136. Id. § 3.04(c). 
137. In Brown v. Memorial National Home Foundation, the attorney general brought an 
action for declaratory relief as to conflicting claims to the assets of chantable trusts created 
for a patriotic organization. 329 P.2d 118, 120 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). The evidence 
sustained a finding that the corporation, which had acquired funds in trust for the benefit 
of needy members of the organization and for the benefit of needy parents of senicemen 
who were World War I1 victims, could not repudiate the trusts by attempting to dedicate 
the property to different uses and exclusion of the patriotic organization. Id. at 12430. 
 he-diversion of the funds to unauthorized purposes-afforded for removal of the 
trustee. Id. at 130. Similarly, in Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, the California Court of 
Appeal found that the hospital, whose articles of incorporation called for the use of its 
assets in the operation, could not forego "the hospital business in favor of [neighborhood] 
clinics." 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). Although various clauses of the articles 
of incorporation rkferred to plural the essential framework of the purposes 
clauses was the operation of a hospital. Id. at 4041. 
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comply with the law.13' Nonprofits are subject to several legal regimes 
ranging from federal and state tax laws, civil rights statutes, and anti- 
trust laws which affect all  organization^.^^^ Other statutes apply to spe- 
cific types of organizations such as private  foundation^.'^^ A director, 
officer, or trustee can be held responsible if an organization violates 
the law.141 For example, a director or officer is liable for a corpora- 
tion's failure to pay taxes if she meets the Internal Revenue Code's 
definition of "[responsible] person" and the failure to pay has been 
Directors involved in day-to-day administration of the or- 
ganization in matters related to taxes and financial records are "[re- 
sponsible] persons."143 Note that although directors are responsible 
for compliance with legal requirements in areas of obvious signifi- 
cance, such as payment of taxes, they are not responsible for technical 
compliance with every aspect of a regulatory regime.'44 
The duty of obedience often arises in the tax context. Organiza- 
tions exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code must be organized and operated exclusively for certain 
approved purposes.145 "No part of the[ir] net earnings . . . [may] 
inure to the benefit of any shareholder or individ~al ." '~~ Restrictions 
on lobbying activities and prohibitions on intervention in political 
campaigns limit nonprofit activity.14' If an organization is operated 
138. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 521 (McKinney 1997) (establishing liability of 
corporation for failure to comply with certain sections of the law); id  § 719 (establishing 
liability for directors for failure to comply with certain requirements). In Committee to Save 
Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos, the New York State Board of Regents also found that by omitting 
the president's salary from the annual informational tax return, Form 990, Adelphi Univer- 
sity failed to comply with Internal Revenue Code reporting requirements. Comm. to Save 
Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos (Bd. of Regents Feb. 5, 1997), at http:// 
www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2002). The University was fined, 
audited, and threatened with revocation of their tax-exempt status for repeated failure to 
file. Id. Furthermore, according to the Board of Regents, this was a duty of law compli- 
ance violation by the president. Id. The Regents also determined that Adelphi's board of 
directors had countenanced an almost complete breakdown of the University's governance 
structure as evidenced in its Articles of Governance, a duty of obedience violation. Id 
139. See BASIL FACCHINA ET AL., PRIVILEGES & EXEMPTIONS ENJOYED BY NONPROFIT ORGA- 
NIZATIONS: A CATALOG AND SOME THOUGHTS O N  NONPROFIT POLICYMAKING (m hog.  Phi- 
lanthropy & The Law, 1993). 
140. See I.R.C. $j 4940(a) (2000) (requiring private foundations to pay an excise tax on 
investment income). 
141. Id. §§ 6671, 6672. 
142. Id. § 6672(a). 
143. See i d  § 6671(c) (absolving certain board members in tax-exempt organizations 
from liability for violating the Internal Revenue Code). 
144. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 232. 
145. I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). 
146. Id 
147. Id 
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primarily for non-exempt purposes, the directors have violated their 
duty of 0 b e d i e n ~ e . l ~ ~  
C. Organizational Accountability Requirements: Record-Keeping and 
Filing Requirements 
The above responsibilities deal with the duties of individuals to 
fulfill their obligations to the organizations they serve. Organizations 
have responsibilities as well which generally consist of keeping man- 
dated records and making them available or filing the documents with 
the appropriate regulator.14' 
To encourage accountability, or at least to enable investigators to 
determine whether the organization has expended its assets respon- 
sibly, most jurisdictions have created ongoing disclosure regimes re- 
quiring charitable organizations to maintain specified records and to 
file financial and other documents with appropriate governmental au- 
thorities on an annual basis.150 Initially, when an organization seeks 
exemption from state taxation or seeks to incorporate, it will file its 
certificate of incorporation or articles of association with the appro- 
priate agency. Typically, these are public documents. 
1. Organizational Records.-The Revised Model Nonprofit Cor- 
poration Act requires a public benefit organization to maintain vari- 
ous corporate records: minutes of meetings and records of 
deliberations if taken without a meeting; appropriate accounting 
records; and membership lists.151 In addition, an organization must 
prepare an annual report or financial ~tatement.'~' Members have a 
right to inspect and copy an organization's records such as a member- 
ship list when such request "is made in good faith and for a proper 
purpose,"153 and to receive an annual financial ~ t a t e m e n t , ' ~ ~  and di- 
148.. Since the duty of obedience requires the directors to uphold the organization's 
founding documents, which require the organization to operate for a charitable purpose, 
operating for nonexempt purposes would be an ultra vires activity. See supra notes 131-137 
and accompanying text (discussing the ultra vires doctrine). 
149. See CAL. COW. CODE §§ 6214, 6320-6323, 6330, 633343334, 6811-6814, 8320-8322 
(West 1990); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 5 s  519-522, 621 (McKinney 1997); REVISED 
MODEL NONPROFIT COW. A m  § 16.01-.22 (1988). 
150. See CAL. COW. CODE §§ 6214, 6320-6323, 6330, 633343334, 6811-6814, 8320-8322; 
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 5 s  519-522, 621; REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. A m  
5 16.01-.22. 
151. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACI- § 16.01(a)-(c). 
152. Id  § 16.22. 
153. Id  § 16.02-.05. 
154. Id. 5 16.20. 
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rectors have the prerogative to inspect books and r e c o r d s . ' " ~ o w -  
ever, many public benefit corporations are non-membership 
organizations, thereby eliminating one source of m0nit0ring.l~~ 
2. State Registration and Filing Requirements.--State filing require- 
ments differ and can become quite complex. Generally, organizations 
may have to register with the attorney general or another agency,15' 
and file annual financial reports.'58 If a nonprofit organization in- 
tends to solicit funds from the public, over forty-five states require the 
organization to register, file financial reports, and in some cases regis- 
ter professional fundraisers.15' An y oversight is likely to come from 
the public, for the documents submitted typically are not reviewed by 
the state authorities until and unless there has been a failure to file.160 
New York law illustrates the filing burdens on nonprofits. All 
New York nonprofit organizations (except churches), which hold 
property or receive income to be used for charitable purposes, must 
register with the Charities Bureau of the New York State Law Depart- 
ment (the attorney general's office) within six months after they re- 
ceive such property or income.161 Thereafter, the organization must 
file an annual report with the attorney general within six months after 
the close of the fiscal year.162 Organizations with unrelated business 
income must file an Unrelated Business Income Tax Report with the 
New York State Department of Taxation and Finance.lGS Annual fi- 
nancial reports and very detailed information concerning solicitation 
and the use of professional fundraisers also must be filed with the 
attorney general.'64 There also may be filings with local authori- 
155. Id. FjFj 16.02-.03, 16.20. 
156. Id. § 6.03. In a corporate business, the shareholders, as the owners of the firm, are 
monitors of management's accountability though this may be more theoretical than real. 
See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Themy of the Shareholder Role: 
"Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 26475 (2001) (discussing the role 
of shareholders in corporate law). 
157. See CAL. GOV'T CODE Fj 12585 (West 1992); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW Fj 8- 
1.4(d) (McKinney 2002). 
158. See CAL. GOV'T CODE $ 12586; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(0-(g). 
159. See Fundraising into the 1990s: State Regulation of Charitable Solicitation After Riley, 24 
U.S.F.L. R~v.571,62425,634 (1990). 
160. Id. at 651 11.513 (recognizing that states lack resources to closely monitor the chari- 
table fundraising community). 
161. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 8-1.4(d). 
162. Id. 8-1.4(q) (1)-(2). Filing requirements differ depending on the income of the 
organization, see id. § 8-1.4(p) (listing filing fees), and whether professional fundraisers are 
used. 
163. N.Y. TAX LAW Fj 292(a) (McKinney 1998) 
164. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4. 
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ties.I6"rganizations of any size will need the assistance of an 
accountant. 
3. Federal Filing Requirements.-Organizations that have obtained 
recognition of exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service must 
file annual information returns on a Form 990.'66 The form must be 
filed by "the 15th day of the fifth calendar month following the close 
of the period for which the return is required."16' An organization 
need not file a Form 990 until it is recognized by the IRS as exempt.16' 
Private foundations with assets of $5000 or more must file an annual 
Form 990-PF information return.16' 
The Form 990 collects financial data mirroring in some ways au- 
dited financial ~ ta tements . '~~  However, the form does not disclose 
whether a nonprofit organization's programs are efficient or effective. 
The form was not designed for that purpose. It began in 1942 as a 
two-page form and it enabled the Bureau of Internal Revenue to keep 
a list of all organizations held to be exempt to the end that the Bureau 
might occasionally inquire into their status and ascertain whether they 
were observing the conditions upon which their exemption was predi- 
cated.171 However, the IRS and charity watchdog groups have raised 
substantial questions as to the accuracy of the information provided to 
165. Henn & Pfeifer, supra note 31, at 184 n.8. 
166. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1(a) (2002). There are exceptions for churches, schools, cer- 
tain other organizations, and organizations, other than private foundations, that normally 
have gross receipts of $5000 or less in each taxable year. I.R.C. § 6033(a) (2) (2000). 
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.60332(e). 
168. Id. § 1.6033-1 (c). 
169. Organizations with $1000 or more of gross income from an unrelated trade or 
business must file Form 990T. Id. §§ 1.6012-2(e), 1.6012-3(a) (5). 
170. See Peter Swords, The Fmm 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501(c)(3) NonproJits, 51 
TAX LAW. 571,577 (1997) (noting that the Form 990 also facilitates state oversight of chari- 
table organizations) ; Karyn R. Vandenuarren, Financial Accountability in Charitable Organiza- 
tions: Mandating an Audit Committee Function, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 969 (2002) (noting 
that the "Form 990 collects financial information, including details such as the organiza- 
tion's five highest-paid employees, five highest-paid contractors, and fundraising 
expenses"). 
171. See Marcus S. Owens, Letter to the Editor, CHRON. PHILANTHROW, Sept. 7, 2000, at 31. 
Mr. Owens is a former Director of the Exempt Organizations Division of the Internal Reve- 
nue Service. 
The GAO notes: 
[The] 2-page form included only three yes/no questions, an income statement, 
and a balance sheet, although some line items required attached schedules. By 
1947, the form (including instructions) had reached 4 pages, although some por- 
tions applied only to certain types of organizations. The required financial infor- 
mation was more extensive. . . . By 2001, the Form 990 had 6 pages (10 parts with 
105 line items), 2 schedules . . . covering 13 pages, and a 45 page instruction 
book. 
GAO REPORT, supra note 6, app. I at 38. 
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the IRS on Form 990 and its effectiveness in facilitating public over- 
sight and evaluation of a charity's activity.'72 
111. CHARITABLE ACCOUNTABILIIY AND SOCIAL NORMS 
Fiduciary accountability presents a paradox. The laws are a b  
stract and offer little concrete guidance. As the number of nonprofit 
organizations has expanded enormously, enforcement efforts by regu- 
lators have declined, and there is little chance of legal sanctions for 
 violation^."^ Increasing publicity about charitable scandals gives the 
impression that wrongdoing is widespread, yet most organizations and 
trustees abide by the rules, adhere to good practices, and demonstrate 
fidelity to the organization's mission and the eleemosynary 
Many times trustees or organizations unfaithful to their trust are un- 
knowingly unfaithful. Why is the level of fidelity so high? Why do 
most fiduciaries do what is right? The answer may be that most chari- 
table fiduciaries have internalized the norms of appropriate behavior. 
Accountability is a normative issue that reflects the role of the non- 
profit sector in law and ~ 0 c i e t y . l ~ ~  
Norms are "informal social regularities that individuals feel obli- 
gated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, [or] because 
of a fear of external non-legal  sanction^."'^^ In recent years, legal 
scholars have examined the role of norms and their relation to law in 
a number of important a r t i~1es . l~~  This section attempts to apply 
172. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-13. 
173. See infia Part N.A.2.f (describing obstacles to law enforcement). 
174. But see Robert C. DeCaudenzi, Tax-Exempt Public Chanties: Inmeasing Accountability 
and Compliance, 36 CATH. LAW. 203, 230 (1995) (stating that "[tlhe frequent occurrence of 
abusive dealings by organization insiders validates the widely-held belief that legislative re- 
form is necessary and, indeed, inevitable"). 
175. Brody, supra note 6, at 465. 
176. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Nonns, 96 M I C H .  L. 
REV. 338,340 (1997). Eric Posner has described a norm as "a rule that distinguishes desira- 
ble and undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to punish a person who 
engages in the undesirable behavior." Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 
144 U .  PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996). 
177. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for 
Immanent Business Nonns, 144 U .  PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the 
Legal Sys ta:  Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond in dust^, 21 J .  LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992); David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: " N o m "  in Contractual Relationships, 
144 U .  PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: 
The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U .  PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) 
[hereinafter Cooter, Decentralized Law]; Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J .  
LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998) [hereinafter Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics]; Robert Cooter, 
Nonnative Failure Themy of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997); Melvin A. Eisenberg, C@rr 
rate Law and Social N m ,  99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the 
Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J .  LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regula- 
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some of the norms literature to the behavior of charitable fiducia- 
r i e ~ . ' ~ ~  Norms of fiduciaries are what Professor Melvin Aron Eisen- 
berg terms moral obligational norms: rules or practices that actors not 
only consciously adhere to but feel obliged to do so for fear of self- 
criticism or criticism by others leading to shame.I7' Legal rules en- 
compass norms and influence as well as change them.lsO The use of 
"norm" herein refers to behavior other than that expressly mandated 
by organizational  rule^.'^' Norms occur throughout society and range 
from the very abstract to the concrete. 
tion of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); McAdams, supra note 176; Richard H. 
Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055 (1996); Posner, 
supra note 176; Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal 
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, 
and Social N m  in Politics and the Law, 27 J .  LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On 
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social N m  and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
903 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social N m  and Social Roles]. 
178. For the application of norms theories to other areas of the law, see Robert D. 
Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social N o m ,  and Economic Analysis, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer & Autumn 1997, at 73 (punitive damages); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudica- 
tion and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 
(1994) [hereinafter Cooter, Structural Adjudication] (contract and commercial law); Eisen- 
berg, supra note 177 (corporate law); Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status 
Signaling and the Law, with Particular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
1069 (1999) (sex discrimination); Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social N m  in a Dangerous 
World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999) (torts); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Al taat ive  Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996) (criminal punishment); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. 
Posner, Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for R e f i  of the Federal Sentencing Guide- 
lines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999) (criminal punishment); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation 
and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1005 (1995) (anti-discrimination law); Richard H. McAdams, Croup N m ,  Gossip, and 
Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1996) (blackmail and privacy); Eric A. Posner, Law and 
Social N m :  The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000) [hereinafter Posner, 
Tax Compliance] (tax law); Eric A. Posner, The Legal Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEGAL 
THEORY 33 (1996) (religion); Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File f i  Bankruptcy: A Critical 
Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 685 (1998) (bankruptcy). 
179. See Eisenherg, supra note 177, at  1257 (defining moral obligational norms). 
180. See Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 177, at 2026 (noting that 
"an appropriately framed law may influence social norms and push them in the right 
direction"). 
181. For examples of organizational rules, see AM. ASS'N OF MUSEUMS, CODE OF ETHICS 
FOR MUSEUMS (2000), http://www.aam-us.org/aamcoe.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002); 
COUNCIL OF BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, INC., CBBS STANDARDS FOR C H A R I T ~ L E  SOLICITATIONS 
(1982), http://www.give.org/standards/chbbstds.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2002); MD. ASS'N 
OF NONPROFIT ORGS, STANDARDS FOR EXCELLENCE: ETHICS AND ACCOUNTAB~L~TY CODE 
FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (1998), http://www.mdnonprofit.org/ethicbook.htm (last vis- 
ited Oct. 2, 2002); NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE CHARIlY OFFICIALS, CHARLESTON PRINCIPLES: ON 
CHARITABLE SOLICITATION USING THE INTERNET (2001), http://www.nasconet.org/stories/ 
storyReader$lO (last visited Nov. 25, 2002). 
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An initial force behind the creation of a norm is the desire indi- 
viduals have for respect, esteem, or prestige from others."* Once a 
norm is established, people obey it in order to avoid being sanctioned 
by others (shame)Is3 and in order to avoid being sanctioned by their 
conscience (guilt).Is4 Stigma, which may occur if a norm is violated, 
provides a powerful incentive to follow the particular normative obli- 
gation. Thus, "[pleople act in accordance with their perceptions of 
what other people think."ls5 According to Professor Richard McAd- 
ams, esteem produces the norm, and "internalization operates as a . . . 
reinforcing rne~hanism." '~~ Thus, violation of a social norm produces 
the expectation of shame, a heavy social tax, which will generate com- 
pliance.ls7 Collectively, this process can achieve a social consensus on 
appropriate behavior.lss Somebody who follows a norm signals that 
she is a good citizen-a c o o p e r a t ~ r . ' ~ ~  One who flouts norms may 
present the opposite i m p r e s s i ~ n . ' ~ ~  According to internalization the- 
ories, "an individual acquires a preference for conformity to a behav- 
ioral standard and suffers some psychological cost . . . when she fails 
to conform," even if others are unaware of the breach.lg1 
Organizations adopt normative behavior too. They "copy each 
other and adopt the standards dictated by broadly based constitu- 
ents," professional associations, or prestigious bodies in their sec- 
tor.lg2 Organizational sociologists, Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, 
have identified three factors that encourage organizations to become 
homogenous in behavior: (1) "'coercive isomorphism,' resulting from 
adherence to standardized procedures and structures imposed on an 
organization, either as a result of government regulation, affiliated 
group agreement, or satisfaction of a particular resource on which the 
organization depends"; (2) "a response to uncertainty, [causing] orga- 
nizations voluntarily [to] imitate or model themselves after organiza- 
tions that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful"; and (3) 
182. McAdams, supra note 176, at 342. 
183. Posner, sups note 176, at 1699. 
184. Eisenberg, s u p a  note 177, at 1257. 
185. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 177, at 2032. 
186. McAdams, supra note 176, at 380. Norms arise and are internalized in a variety of 
ways. See Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 177, at 1661-64; Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 
1263. 
187. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function o f l a w ,  supra note 177, at 2030. 
188. Id. at 2032-33. 
189. Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 1260. 
190. Id. 
191. McAdams, supra note 176, at 376; Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 1258. 
192. Brody, supra note 6, at 495. 
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the professionalism of managers and staff which creates pressures to 
conform. 
Norms pervade charitable activity. As early as the thirteenth cen- 
tury, papal decrees were issued to encourage individuals to donate to 
charitable or religious purposes.lg4 The price for failure to follow this 
norm was eternal damnation.lg5 In other words, the individual "might 
be denied the Eucharist and interred in unconsecrated ground."lg" 
In Tudor times, charitable activity was part of the Puritan ethic."' 
The demands of the new world made philanthropy and charitable ac- 
tivities part of the Pilgrim code of  ond duct.''^ Alexis de Tocqueville 
noted the propensity of Americans of all classes to join associations- 
another societal norm.''' In each of these periods, norms arose when 
there was a consensus in society as to the appropriate behavior, which 
typically occurred only when the behavior benefited society as a 
whole.*OO The fear of God, or of disorder, or the needs of society 
created tremendous pressures to conform. 
Today, participation in charitable activity is an ingrained part of 
social life. Serving on a charitable board is a means of signaling one- 
self to others as a solid citizen and a responsible participant in the 
community. Board service brings respect. At one time that symbol 
was a means and an end; little more was expected, particularly if the 
director or trustee was a substantial contributor or the use of her 
193. Id. at 496 (citing Paul J. DiMaggio & Mralter Mr. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Insti- 
tutional Isomwphism and Colkctive Rationality in Organizational Fieldr, in THE NEW INSTITU- 
TIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS at 63, 67-73 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio 
eds., 1991)). 
194. SeeJox~s, supra note 8, at 3 (citing Letter of Authorisation for Collectors for Chari- 
table Institutions, approved by the 4th Lateran Council (1215) and included in the decre- 
tals of Gregory IX) ("A Papal Decretal of Gregory IX urged the faithful to seek their 
salvation by bequeathing part of their wealth to the support of pious causes."). 
. . 
195. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLICK & FREDERICK M r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at  356 (London, Cambridge 2d ed. 1898). 
196. JONES, s u m  note 8, at 3. 
197. Puritanism encouraged an attack on poverty by combining the discipline of Presby- 
terian doctrine, "relief for the impotent poor, work for the sturdy, . . . punishment for the 
idle" and support of philanthropic organizations for individuals to benefit and improve 
themselves. CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 1603-1714, at 70-71 (2d ed. 
1982). Throughout the seventeenth century, charitable endowments were created to senre 
the poor. SeeMT.K JORDAN, PHILANTHROPY I N  ENGLAND 1480-1660, at  90 (2d ed. 1964) (dis- 
cussing the private financing of poor areas in urban centers). 
198. John Mrinthrop's A Model of Christian Charity 1630, and Cotton Mather's Bonifacim or 
Essays to Do Good were early promulgators of a charitable ethos. See ROBERT H. BREMNER, 
AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 5-15 (Daniel J. Boorstin, ed., 2d ed. 1988). 
199. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Vintage Books 1945) 
(1840). 
200. Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 178, at 224. 
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name gave the organization respectability. This led to a passive, often 
uninvolved role as a nonprofit director. Even so, there were certain 
fundamental norms that governed fiduciary behavior."' Fiduciaries 
understood implicitly that they were not supposed to steal from the 
charities whose assets they controlled.202 Almost everyone at every 
time would agree that laicenous behavior deserved disapproval or 
censure, particularly if it might be detected.203 Beyond that, the social 
norms governing fiduciary behavior are uncertain. One's behavior 
sometimes is the individual's moral compass. 
The primary non-externally imposed sanction upon nonprofit 
trustees is shame-the embarrassment that publicity will reveal a di- 
rector of a charity to be guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty. Such 
publicity or "shame risk proves a more effective deterrent to opportu- 
nistic behavior than the fiduciary rules of nonprofit law. The absence 
of caselaw on the state the norm-like generality of the statutes 
themselves,205 and the lack of enforcement capacity by government 
officials at the state and federal levels,206 suggest that the best and 
most efficient way to improve charitable accountability may be 
through encouragement of responsible norm-based behavior, defined 
as behavior that a well-functioning legal regime would encourage. 
Much of the law relating to fiduciary behavior is the explication 
of social norms, which may explain why the statutes are so abstract in 
language. Though fiduciary laws have been codified for many years, 
their content is generally unknown by the public and charitable fidu- 
ciaries.*'' Most nonprofit organizations do not have in-house counsel 
who can advise fiduciaries on an ongoing basis, and the dearth of state 
caselaw provides little guidance. How are fiduciaries supposed to act 
when the situation is not so unambiguous regarding whether to steal 
201. Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 1265. 
202. SeeJoel L. Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-fw-Profit Chganizations and the Need fm Regu- 
latory R e f m ,  in PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CH~WGING AMERICA 172, 
177-78 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds., 1999) (concluding that most intelli- 
gent people understand that nonprofits are run in an appropriate manner). 
203. See McAdams, supra note 176, at 355 (arguing that "[ilf many people agree that a 
behavior deserves disapproval, if there is an inherent risk that the behavior will be de- 
tected, . . . then the pattern of disapproval itself creates costs to the behavior*). 
204. This is in marked contrast to federal statutes and regulations which are arcane, 
- 
complicated, and have generated substantial administrative and judicial rulemaking. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. § 6033 (2000) (setting forth the requirement that certain tax-exempt organiza- 
tions file annual returns). 
205. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. A m  § 8.30 (1988) (creating a standard 
of care for nonprofit directors). 
206. Vandenvarren, supra note 170, at 975. 
207. CJ McAdams, supra note 176, at 403 (indicating that without media coverage, the 
public does not learn of legislative activity). 
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or not? From where do the other social norms governing fiduciary 
behavior come? The law gives expression to appropriate fiduciary 
behavior. 
A. Fiduciaq Statutes as Expressive Law 
It is a truism that laws carry or express meanings. The expressive 
theory of law basically states that the law sends a message, conveying 
additional meanings that extend beyond the cold words of a stat- 
ute.''' Law contains, in Professor Lawrence Lessig's words, "social 
 meaning^""^-guides to behavior that are incentives to certain ac- 
tions and stigmas to others.'1° The social meanings of some of the 
fiduciary statutes induce conduct that complies with social norms.21 
Thus, the fiduciary rules can be thought of as generalized social 
norms, rather than concrete guides to behavior.'12 
Social norms are interrelated with the expressive functions of law. 
When the law makes a statement, it can strengthen a norm embodied 
in a particular statute or weaken a norm it condemns.213 Thus, gov- 
ernment can impede unwanted norms-smoking and littering are two 
examples-or facilitate desirable norms, such as recycling. Law can 
influence behavior by changing and shaping the norms that deter- 
mine the meaning of certain kinds of behavior, thereby enhancing 
compliance with the law.214 Shaping social norms can be more effi- 
cient than increasing the resources spent on enforcement efforts or 
sanctions. When social norms encourage people to engage in appro- 
208. See Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 177, at 2051 (noting that 
"[mlany debates over the appropriate content of law are really debates over the statement 
that law makes"). 
209. See Lessig, supra note 177, at 951. 
210. Id. at 950. 
21 1. Id. at 998. 
212. For example, the language of the "duty of care" section of the New York Not-for- 
Profit Corporation Law, which occurs in the statutes of other states, is one such abstract 
statute. See CAL. CORP. CODE 5 5231 (a) (West 1990) (establishing that "[a] director shall 
perform the duties . . . in good faith . . . and with such care, including reasonable inquity, 
as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances"); 
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 5 717(a) (McKinney 1997) (declaring the standard of care 
to be "good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent 
men would exercisen). 
213. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 177, at 203435. 
214. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges us. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky N m  Problem, 67 
U .  CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000) (describing the interplay between norms, laws, and deci- 
sionmakers in the enforcement of the law); Lessig, supra note 177, at 997-98 (discussing 
the incentive effect of social meanings). 
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priate behavior, it comes at a lower cost than the imposition of a legal 
sanctioning regime. Therefore, it is more efficient."" 
The expressive dimension of governmental action plays a central, 
but unappreciated, role in a variety of areas of the law: constitutional 
law, criminal law, family law, and the law relating to tax-exempt orga- 
nizations. Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the main expres- 
sive role of law, insofar as it is properly expressive, is in shaping social 
norms.216 In the nonprofit setting, where resources for enforcement 
are sparse, the ability to inculcate norms of appropriate behavior is 
particularly important. An accountability regime, which has as its pri- 
mary focus remedial and educational functions, will be more cost ef- 
fective than additional governmental enforcement activity which not 
only increases costs from the public purse, but also may increase the 
transaction costs of the affected  organization^.^" 
Thus, the task of government should be to take steps through 
statutes, regulations, expressions of policy, and publicity to shape 
those norms and behavior it wants to encourage and to impede those 
it seeks to discourage. Ideally, law should "affect behavior by strength- 
ening the nonlegal enforcement of the norm. "218 This can be done 
by new legislation, or as several norms scholars have noted, through 
increased or, in the nonprofit sector, by the creation of 
bodies as suggested in this proposal. Professor Sunstein suggests that 
a large objective of the law is to shift social norms and social mean- 
ing.220 The relevant law may signal a new norm and the enforcement 
of new sanctions but little in the way of enforcement activity. In these 
situations, the law occupies a signaling function of appropriate behav- 
ior and "inculcat[es] the expectation of social opprobrium and . . . 
shame in those who deviate from the announced new norm."221 A 
good deal of governmental action is self-consciously designed to 
change norms, and the problem in the nonprofit situation is what a p  
215. Posner, Tax Compliance, supra note 178, at 1791. 
216. Sunstein, On the Expessive Function of Law, supra note 177, at 202526. 
217. See inha note 248 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 4958-the intermedi- 
ate sanctions legislation). 
218. McAdarns, s u p a  note 176, at 399. 
219. See id. at 403 (discussing the media's consensus building effect in changing norms); 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, s u p a  note 177, at 2050-51 (describing the role of 
politicians in law as a norm changing technique). 
220. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 177, at 2031. 
221. Id. at 2032. M'hen expressive law shifts social norms and social meanings, there 
may "be nonn cascades, as reputational incentives shift behavior in new directions." Id. at 
2032-33 (citing TIMUR KIJRAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 3 ( 1995) ) . 
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proach or technique government should adopt to effect a normative 
change which will alter behavior in the direction government desires. 
B. Normative Elements of Nonprofit Fiduciary Duties of Care and Loyalty 
The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are driven largely by social 
norms. The duty of care statutes prescribe liabilities for unlawful dis- 
tributions,"' but generally eliminate most liability if the director is 
unc~mpensated.~'~ The actual mandates of the statutes are aspira- 
tional. The general standards for directors include that a director ex- 
ercise his duties in "good faith" with the care that "an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar cir- 
cumstan~es."''~ These standards or moralistic phrases reflect shared 
norms of appropriate behavior. 
Until very recently, the duty of care was a minimal, passive re- 
sponsibility. Professor Eisenberg has shown how the directorial duty 
of care in the for-profit context rose significantly in the past f&een 
years, at the same time that liability for duty of care violations was cut 
ba~k.''~ The change he describes is due to a shift in social norms to a 
more rigorous ~tandard."~ 
The level of directorial care is largely driven by social norms 
rather than the threat of liability.2" In the past decade, an inefficient, 
non-obligational norm that allowed and protected a lower duty of di- 
rectorial care was replaced by a more efficient, obligational norm re- 
quiring a higher level of expected attention and informed decision 
making.'" The shift in this norm was driven by a change in belief 
systems, and in the area of the duty of loyalty, by the threat of liabil- 
ity.'" Caselaw influenced the changing norms involving the duty of 
222. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 5 719(a) (1), (5) (McKinney 1997) (establishing 
that directors are jointly and severally liable for distributing cash or property to members 
and making loans to directors or officers); see REVISED MODEL NONPROF~T COW. A m  
5 8.33(a) (1988) (holding directors personally liable for unlawful distributions). 
223. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 5 720-a (exempting uncompensated direc- 
tors and others from liability except to the organization). 
224. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. Am 5 8.30(a) (1)-(2). 
225. Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 1266-67. In addition to Professor Eisenberg, other 
authors like ~ i l l i a m  Allen, Jack Jacobs, and Leo Stine have commented on the incfease in 
duty of care cases against directors in the last fifteen years. William T. Allen et al., Function 
Over Fonn: A Reassessmat of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 
1287, 1290 (2001). 
226. Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 1268-70. 
227. Id. at 1265. 
228. Id. at 126869. 
229. Id. at 1269. 
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care, clarified and elaborated on the fiduciary responsibilities,230 and 
self-regulatory ~ tandards ,~~ '  and adopted a more proactive duty of 
care standard.232 The change in duty of care norms was contempora- 
neous with statutory provisions eliminating or limiting the personal 
liability of a director.233 Professor Eisenberg attributes the shifts in 
caselaw to media coverage, closer scrutiny by institutional investors, 
and new information conveyed by takeover bids.234 
In the nonprofit area, a shift in fiduciary norms is beginning to 
occur, but the causal agents of corporate law are not so effective. 
When an attorney general brings an action against a charity, the most 
sensible and rational response of the board is to settle the matter as 
soon as possible, both to save the reputation of the organization and 
to avoid publicity and shame to the board member.235 Unlike the cor- 
porate sector, there are neither shareholders nor investment analysts 
to focus on the organization and there is generally less information 
available. In the corporate world there are copious reports, bulletins, 
and analyses by the financial press. Coverage of the nonprofit sector 
is more episodic and infrequent, though this is beginning to 
change.236 
230. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (concluding that a direc- 
tor's duty of care encompasses the duty to make informed business decisions, and that 
generally, determining whether a director has violated the informed judgment duty should 
be based on  a gross negligence analysis); CEDE & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 
368-70 (Del. 1993) (stating that a breach of the duty of care will not be found unless there 
has been a failure to gather information prior to an important decision and rejecting the 
lower court's conclusion that a finding of breach also requires a monetary loss), modified in 
part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
231. See PRINCIPLES OF GORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02 (1994) 
(recommending a duty of fair dealing). 
232. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (asserting that the duty of care inquily focuses on whether there was a good faith 
effort to be informed and exercise judgment); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 
822 (NJ. 1981) (stating that "[d]irectors are under a continuing obligation to keep in- 
formed about the activities of the corporation"). 
233. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). 
234. Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 1268-69. The difference between the takeover offer 
- .  
bid price and the existing stock market price communicates information about managerial 
inefficiency. I d  at 1269. 
235. The duty of care violations involving Adelphi University provide an exception. See 
Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos (Bd. of Regents Feb. 5, 1997), at http:// 
www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2002) (recommending the re- 
moval i f  trustees for various-actions). In that case, the primary opportunistic fiducialy was 
the president who controlled the board and was unwilling to settle. I d  The matter was an 
administrative one involving the New York State Board of Regents, which has ultimate 
s u p e ~ s o r y  authority over education in the state. Id. 
236. See DeCaudenzi, supra note 174, at  204-05 (describing media coverage of the PTL 
ministry scandal and mismanagement in Health Net, the United Way, and the Cystic Fibre 
sis ~oundation).  
- 
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The duty of loyalty deals with conflict of interest situations- 
transactions in which fiduciaries have a direct or indirect interest.237 
Under the law of charitable trusts, such transactions by a trustee are 
prohibited.238 However, nonprofit corporation law has moved to the 
business corporate standard, whereby the fact that a transaction is in- 
terested is less important than the process by which it is approved and 
its fairness to the corporation.23g Thus, the statutes require, but do 
not explicate, a duty of loyalty. They offer road maps to obtain ap- 
proval of the interested transaction and essentially deal with whom 
has the burden of proof when such transactions are attached.240 
Breaches of loyalty are often difficult to uncover, and as some inter- 
ested transactions may be a necessity for the nonprofit, there is no 
bright line differentiating appropriate from inappropriate 
transactions. 
Unlike the duty of care, where organizations may hold harmless 
directors even though there is a fiduciary violation,241 duty of loyalty 
breaches can result in penalties. The remedies at the state level have 
included restitution of improperly acquired and the creation 
of a constructive trust for the organization.243 However, in a situation 
where the organization has not been harmed,244 a court merely re- 
quired the directors to read the court's opinion and to create a proce- 
dure to disclose all interested transactions.245 
On the federal level, the original remedy for duty of loyalty viola- 
tions was revocation of tax exemption,246 a sanction so draconian and 
infrequently exercised, save for the most egregious situations, that it 
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 5 170 cmt. c (1959). 
238. Id. 5 170(1)-(2); see also id. § 379 cmt. a (describing the various duties of a charita- 
ble trustee). Parts of section 379 have been revised. Id. 5 379 (revised 1992). 
239. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1988) (establishing the approval 
method for conflict of interest transactions). 
240. See id. 
241. Id. § 8.30 cmt. 2. 
242. See John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795, 797-98, 806 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming the 
discussion of the lower court that removed the director from all posts and ordered restitu- 
tion of $1.7 million). 
243. See Mile-0-Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 210 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) 
(reversing the lower court's decision and requiring that the former president hold a cer- 
tain piece of property until the president's former organization could pay for the land). 
244. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1016 (D.D.C. 1974) (noting instances of selfdealing that resulted in 
insignificant harm). 
245. Id. at 1020-21. 
246. Revised Proc. 90-27, 1990-1 C.B. 514. 
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had little deterrent In 1996, Congress created a new regula- 
tory scheme with sanctions short of an exemption revocation when 
sections 501 (c) (3) or 501 (c) (4) organizations provide excessive eco- 
nomic benefits to insiders.248 
Norms do exist that seek to freshen the atmosphere when inter- 
ested transactions are considered. Perhaps surprisingly, they are not 
included in the statutes. State legislation typically requires disclosure 
of material facts or the fiduciary's interest in the transaction.24g For 
example, most jurisdictions do not require the interested party to ab- 
sent herself from the deliberations concerning the interested transac- 
t i~n. '~ '  The interested director usually can be considered for quorum 
purposes,251 and if necessary can cast a vote in favor of the transac- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Well-run nonprofits should have a conflict of interest policy, 
which is not required by statute in any jurisdiction save one.253 Some 
nonprofit professional organizations recommend such but 
many organizations, even of substantial size, have no such proce- 
d u r e ~ . ~ ~ ~  Other private normative standards suggest that interested 
directors take no part in the deliberations concerning the particular 
 transaction^.'^^ 
247. See DeCaudenzi, supra note 174, at 214 (asserting that the remedy is harsh and may 
not punish the wrongdoer). 
248. I.R.C. 5 4958 (2000). The enforcement regime is based on the approval previously 
used for private foundations. I.R.C. 5s 4941-4945. Under the new approach, if an insider 
receives an "excess benefit transaction," a penalty, an excise tax of 25-percent of the excess 
benefit is imposed upon the person engaged in the excess benefit transaction. Id. 
§ 4958(a) (1). Lesser penalties can be imposed on the organization's managers who know- 
ingly permit the organization to engage in the excess benefit transaction. Id. § 4958(a) (2). 
The excise tax increases to 200 percent if there is a repeat violation. Id. § 4958(b). Loss of 
exemption could still occur in egregious situations. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-8 (2002). 
249. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1997). 
250. See, e.g., id. § 715(a). 
251. See, e.g., id. § 715(c). 
252. See, e.g., id. § 715(a)-(b). 
253. Arizona requires nonprofit corporations that have assets with a book value of more 
than $10 million or revenues greater than $2 million to adopt a conflict of interest policy 
regarding transactions between the corporation and "interested persons." ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-3864 (West Supp. 2001). "Interested person" refers to an officer or director of 
the nonprofit but not an employee. Id. 
254. See COUNCIL OF BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, INC., supra note 181 (stating that " [ t ]  he gou 
errzing board has the ultimate oversight authon'ty for any charitable organization . . . . To meet these 
standards, the mganization shall have . . . [;lo transaction(s) in which any board or staff 
members have material conflicting interests with the charity resulting from any relation- 
ship or business affiliation."). 
255. See Carvajal, supra note 128 (discussing a case in which the Alvin Ailey Dance Com- 
pany had no conflict of interest policy when it awarded an architectural commission to the 
chair of the board's son-in-law without any competition). 
256. See Debbie Mack, Circuit Roundup, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 2002, at 60 (reporting 
on an appeals court's affirmance of decision that found directors had not engaged in self- 
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C. Intermediate Sanctions: Changzng Nonprofit Norms 
At the federal level social norms have played an important role in 
defining and fleshing out ambiguous federal fiduciary standards. The 
fundamental rule against opportunistic fiduciary behavior is the pro- 
hibition against private in~rement.'~' In order to obtain exemption 
under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, no net earn- 
ings may inure to insiders such as founders, directors, or officers.258 
The private inurement prohibition is "the primary distinction between 
taxable and tax-exempt entities."259 This rule though first adopted in 
1909260 remains elusive, elastic, vague, and inconsistently applied.261 
It had always been recognized to be wrong for nonprofit execu- 
tives to pay themselves excessive compensation or engage in other op- 
portunistic behavior. Beyond the vague inurement proscription, 
federal law only dealt specifically with fiduciary behavior for private 
f~undations,'~' where Congress believed there had been abuses by do- 
nors and insiders. State principles against excessive compensation 
were seen as soft-core interested transactions and were less venal than 
other forms of interested transactions.263 Congressional hearings in 
1993 produced several outrageous instances of excessive compensa- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Though the existing federal law could penalize the organiza- 
tion by removing recognition of its tax-exempt status, the Internal 
dealing because they informed other directors of these conflicts and abstained from the 
decision at issue). 
257. I.R.C. 5 501(c) (3) (2000). 
258. Id. A related "private benefit" doctrine prohibits section 501 (c) (3) organizations 
from providing a substantial economic benefit to "private interests." See Treas. Reg. 
5 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (ii) (2002). As interpreted by the I.R.S., a "private benefitn must be 
more than incidental to disqualify an organization in contrast to the absolute ban on pri- 
vate inurement. Id. 5 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (c) (1). 
259. Darryl1 K Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Priuate Inurement and 
Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 577 (2000). 
260. Corporation Special Excise Tax of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, 36 Stat. 11, 112. 
261. Jones, s u p a  note 259, at 590 (stating that "the courts and the [Internal Revenue] 
Service are content to proceed as though private inurement is incapable of definition, but 
as easily recognizable, as pornography. The result is a chameleon-like doctrine that seem- 
ingly defies precise identification or prediction."). The absence of guidance, the general- 
ity of the phrase, and the infrequency of the use of the sanction-revocation of tax-exempt 
status-became a practical problem. The generality and ambiguity of the rule was insuffi- 
- - .  
cient to signal normative behavior. 
262. See I.R.C. $5 49414945. 
263. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 5 715(e) (McKinney 1997) (giving author- 
ity to fix board compensation without any of the procedures applying to other interested 
transactions). 
264. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1 0 3 ~  CONG., 
REPORT ON REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE TAX RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC HARITIES 1415 
(1994). 
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Revenue Service rarely, if ever, imposed such a penalty,265 because the 
removal of exemption was like hanging someone for stealing a loaf of 
bread. It was too draconian for the wrong, and hurt the organization 
rather than the individuals who engaged in private inurement. Thus, 
Congress passed Internal Revenue Code section 4958,266 the so-called 
intermediate sanctions legislation.267 
The legislation itself did not say what was excessive compensa- 
t i ~ n , ~ ~ ~  but did express the norm and thereby, strengthened it.'6" It 
created the concept of an "excess benefit transaction," and placed a 
tax upon individuals, insiders who "exercise substantial influence" on 
nonprofit  organization^.^^^ The regulations suggest a procedure 
whereby the organization can rely on a rebuttable presumption that 
the transaction is not an excess benefit transaction if: (1) its terms 
were approved by a board or board committee composed of individu- 
als who have no conflict of interest; (2) disinterested board members 
relied upon comparable data; and (3) the board "adequately docu- 
mented the basis for its de t e rmina t i~n . "~~~  
The regulation creates guidelines for new behavioral norms: (1) 
people who are interested in a transaction should not participate in 
the decision; (2) comparability requires people to look around to see 
if the transaction is fair; and (3) adequate documentation is re- 
q~ i r ed .*~*  This procedure results in a more rational, formalized ap- 
proach guided by experts, such as lawyers and compensation 
consultants. These norms further reinforce the state fiduciary stan- 
dards and flesh them out. Though the IRS's audit capability has de- 
~lined,*~"ts reputation and the fear the Service engenders may 
improve fiduciary behavior. The intermediate legislation strength- 
265. Kevin F. Donohue, C~ossroads in Hospital Conversions-A Suruqi of Nonprofit Hospital 
Conversion Litigation, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 91 (1999); see also Lawrence E .  Singer, The 
Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal Response to Hospitals' Changes in Charitable Status, 
23 AM. J .L .  & MED. 221, 223 n.13 (1997). 
266. I.R.C. 3 4958. 
267. See Gary, supra note 14, at 633 (citing Grant M'illiams, Stopping Excessive Benefits, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 13, 1998, at 29). 
268. See id. 
269. See McAdams, supra note 176, at 397 (stating that "law can strengthen a norm by 
imposing sanctions on those who violate it"). 
270. I.R.C. § 4958; see also Gary, supra note 14, at 632-33; Shannon McGhee Hernandez, 
Note, Convmsions of Nonpofit Hospitals to I;wProfit Status: The Tennessee Experience, 28 U .  
M E M .  L. REV. 1077, 1092-93 (1998). 
271. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6T(a) (2002). 
272. See id. 
273. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 (noting "[flrom 1996 through 2001, IRS st&ng 
for overseeing exempt organizations fell by about 15 percent while-the number of . . 
Forms 990 filed by charities increased 25 percent [and] [tlhe rate at which the IRS ex- 
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ened the nonprofit community's adherence to a norm, and gave ex- 
panded publicity by placing the norm in the tax laws and regulations. 
As this norm becomes publicized, more charitable fiduciaries will in- 
ternalize it, thereby reinforcing it and raising fiduciary standards as a 
However, this new norm comes at a substantial cost for nonprofit 
organizations. Larger organizations as a matter of course retain ex- 
pensive compensation consultants. The regulations allow smaller or- 
ganizations to obtain salary comparisons with these similar sized 
nonprofit5 to gain use of the non-excess benefit presumption.275 The 
revenue generated by the excise tax imposed for violations of the stat- 
ute probably will be nowhere near the transaction costs to nonprofit 
organizations. 
A statute can strengthen a norm by imposing sanctions on those 
who violate it. The enforcement effort by the Internal Revenue Ser- 
vice will not increase, but most organizations will adhere to the newly 
defined norm. Not so obvious as an enforcement action or monetary 
sanction, the law can enhance a norm-in this case the proscription 
against private inurement-by "expressing it" through regulations 
without taking extra enforcement actions.276 However, this change in 
normative behavior, though effective is inefficient because of the costs 
to those affected by it. A more efficient approach to changing norma- 
tive behavior and improving fiduciary obligations is proposed in Part 
VI of this Article. 
Accountability is the requirement that charitable organizations 
have to report their activities, explain their mission, and justify their 
finances.277 Charities are accountable to the public and exist because 
amined these returns" fell to .43 percent in 2001 compared to .73 percent in 1998 and 
1999). 
274. Cf: McAdams, supra note 176, at 379-80 (arguing that internalization does not ex- 
plain all norms, specifically non-unanimous consent norms because a unanimous consen- 
sus could not have existed before the norm existed and "internalization of norms . . . 
sometimes provides the only explanation for behavior"). 
275. Treas. Reg. Fj 53.4958-6T(c) (2) (ii) . 
276. McAdams, supra note 176, at 397-98. 
277. See Kevin P. Kearns, The Strategic Management of Accountability in Nonprofit Organiza- 
tions: An Analytic Framework, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 185, 186 (1994) (accountability involves 
concepts of "oversight agenc[ies] with explicit standards of performance . . . and formal 
record keeping and reporting requirements as a means of demonstrating compliance with 
standards"). 
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they provide a public benefit to There are several kinds of 
accountability. One is financial. Financial accountability inquires 
into whether the assets of the corporation are being used properly 
and whether the financial information is being disclosed adequately 
and accurately.279 The complex reporting requirements relating to 
charitable fundraising is another kind of financial accountability. A 
third type of accountability requiring a more qualitative type of analy- 
sis inquires whether charities are attaining their missions.*'O A fourth 
type of accountability concerns whether the officers, directors, and 
trustees have lived up to their responsibilities or have used the organi- 
zation to benefit themselves.281 This has been called "negative ac- 
~oun tab i l i t y . "~~~  Another critical accountability issue considers who 
should be able to hold the charity accountable.283 
A. Who Can Hold Charities Accountable: Standing Issues 
A fundamental distinction between the business corporation, 
where shareholders have formal legal authority to assume fiduciary 
accountability, and the nonprofit organization is the limited nature of 
278. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (stating that 
"[clharitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public 
benefit"). 
279. The IRS Form 990 Annual Report, the fundamental reporting tool, has been criti- 
cized. See ELIZABETH K KEATING & PETER FRUMKIN, REENGINEERING ONPROFIT FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY: TOWARD A MORE RELIABLE FOUNDATION FOR REGULATION 10-12 (The 
Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs. & Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Haward Univ., Working Paper 
No. 4, 2000) (analyzing the Form 990); Swords, supra note 170, at 598-605 (examining the 
portions of the Form 990 that deal with aggregate payments and concluding that they will 
most likely not contain information regarding self-dealing transactions); GAO REPORT, 
supra note 6, at 8-13 (declaring that the accuracy of the information on 990 is unknown). 
280. Vanderwarren, supra note 170, at 963-64. 
281. See I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (2000) (earnings of nonprofits cannot go to private individu- 
als); REVISED MODEL NONPROFTT CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1988) (indicating when a conflict of 
interest is acceptable). 
282. See Swords, supra note 170, at 598 (indicating that the aggregate payment portions 
of the Form 990 do not deal well with "negative accountability," i.e. selfdealing problems). 
283. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT xxvi-xxvii (indicating that attorneys gen- 
eral have the responsibility of monitoring nonprofit corporations). There are many ways 
to analyze the components of nonprofit accountability. Professor Kevin Kearns has catego- 
rized four types of nonprofit accountability: (1) "compliance accountability," which re- 
quires adherence to legal and contractual obligations; (2) "negotiated accountability," 
which is a "negotiation" between the nonprofit and its environment as the charity deals with 
loosely defined social values and political trends; (3) "professional/discretionary accounta- 
bility," which reflects the industry-wide performance standard of professionals working for 
the organization; and (4) "anticipatory/positioning accountability," which acknowledges 
that the organization can anticipate future compliance standards and could "attempt to 
play a meaningful proactive role in shaping and defining the standards" by lobbying for 
certain policies and practices. Kearns, supra note 277, at 18889. 
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standing to sue by the many classes affected by the nonprofit enter- 
p r i ~ e . ~ ' ~  Because of these traditional limitations on standing, non- 
profit fiduciary duties in most situations are "legal obligation[s] 
without legal sanction [s] ."285 
1. Members.-If the organization is a membership organization, 
that is, one legally constituted to give members the right to elect direc- 
t o r ~ , * ~ ~  a memberz8' may have standing to Some courts have 
held that members of nonprofit organizations may bring derivative 
suits, viewing the members as analogous to shareholders in business 
corporations.289 Members also may sue to enjoin an ultra vires act,*" 
284. Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. 
REV. 131, 145 (1993) (citing DEBORAH A. DEMO=, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 
8 2:04 (1987 & Supp. 1992)). 
285. Brody, supra note 6, at 466-67. 
286. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5056 (MTest 1990) (defining member as someone who has 
the right to vote for directors or  on other major issues); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977) (noting that the party was not a normal membership 
organization because it lacked members). 
287. "Member" refers to one "having membership rights in a corporation in accordance 
with the provisions of its certificate of incorporation o r  bylaws." N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
CORP. LAW § 102(a)(9) (McKinney 1997). This differs from the common usage of the 
word "member" by nonprofit organizations, which often refers to preferred customer o r  
patron status. See Chamber of Commerce v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 69 F.3d 600, 602 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (stating that the American Medical Association objects to a definition of mem- 
ber articulated by the Federal Election Commission that would have prohibited physicians 
or  medical students who did not belong to state medical associations from heing included 
as members), clanifed by 76 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
288. R ~ S E D  MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30(a) (establishing that a "member o r  
members having five percent or  more of the voting power or  by fifty members, whichever is 
lessn may file a derivative suit); see also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5420(b), 7710; N.Y. NOT-FOR- 
PROFIT COW. LAW §§ 623(a), 720(b)(3); Hansmann, supra note 5, at 606 (indicating that 
while most statutes are silent on standing questions, they generally adopt charitable trust 
rules). Some state courts have given standing to members. See Morgan v. Robertson, 609 
S.W.2d 662, 664 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that the law requires a member bringing a 
derivative suit to be a member at the instance of the contested transaction); Brenner v. 
Powers, 584 N.E.2d 569, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Jackson v. Stuhlfire, 547 N.E.2d 1146, 
1147-48 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990); Leeds v. Harrison, 72 A.2d 371, 377 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1950); Bourne v. Williams, 633 S.W.2d 469,471-73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Governing Bd. v. 
Pannill, 561 S.Mr.2d 517, 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Other courts have refused to grant 
members standing to sue. See Basich v. Bd. of Pensions, 493 N.MT.2d 293, 296 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992) (affirming the trial court's decision that congregationalists of church were not 
members with standing to sue); Voelker v. St. Louis Mercantile Library Ass'n, 359 S.W.2d 
689, 698 (Mo. 1962). 
289. See, e.g., Bourne, 633 S.W.2d at  471-73. The Revised Nonprofit Corporation Model 
Act provides for derivative suits by members having five percent or more of the vote o r  fifty 
in number, whichever is less. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT 8 6.30 (1988). Several 
jurisdictions permit member derivative suits. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.2491 (MTest 
1990); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 5 623(a). 
290. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 8 3.04. 
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or sue former directors or officers of a ~harity.~'' For example, mem- 
bers of a nonprofit luncheon club had standing to sue the organiza- 
tion over its refusal to admit women as members and guests in 
violation of the charter.2g2 Members have been given the statutory 
right to inspect the nonprofit organization's records and may sue to 
enforce that right.293 However, for nonprofit non-membership organiza- 
tions that have self-perpet~ati~lg boards,294 normally only the attorney 
general or a director has standing to sue.295 
Under trust and corporate principles, the public lacks standing to 
sue absent specific statutory permission. Although the property is de- 
voted to purposes which benefit the whole community, the benefit to 
an individual member of the public is incidental. Even a specific ben- 
eficiary of a charity is but an intermediary through whom the public 
advantage is achieved. Therefore, it is the attorney general who repre- 
sents the public interest, who has the right to sue. A more practical 
reason for denying the public standing is that the persons benefited 
by charities are usually members of a large and shifting class of the 
public. If every member of that class had standing, the charity could 
be subjected to unnecessary l i t iga t i~n .~ '~  
Traditional standing limitations occasionally have been relaxed 
in matters of public importance that relate to charities or where the 
plaintiffs have a special intere~t.~" A general survey of courts' willing- 
ness to allow private parties to sue for the enforcement of charitable 
obligations found the following elements to be of importance: (1) 
"the extraordinary nature of the acts complained of and the remedy 
sought by the plaintiff;" (2) "the presence of fraud or misconduct on 
the part of the charity or its directors;" (3) "the state attorney gen- 
291. Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1401 (8th Cir. 1989). 
292. Cross v. Midtown Club, Inc., 365 A.2d 1227, 122830 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976). 
293. SeeStueve v. N. Lights, Inc., 797 P.2d 130 (Idaho 1990) (granting member of non- 
profit rural electric cooperative access to cooperative records); Bourgeois v. Landrum, 396 
So. 2d 1275 (La. 1981) (granting voting church members examination rights of corporate 
records pursuant to Louisiana nonprofit statute). 
294. James J. Fishman, The Deuelopmmt of Nonprofit Co-rporation Law and an Agenda for 
Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 669-70 (1985). 
295. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACI. §§ 1.70, 6.30. 
296. Fishman, supra note 294, at 670. 
297. See, e.g., YMCA v. Covington, 484 A.2d 589, 592 (D.C. 1984) (concluding that mem- 
bers of the YMCA had standing to sue the YMCA for breach of duty). But see Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28 (1976) (holding that indigents did not have stand- 
ing to sue the Secretary of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service over a ruling ex- 
empting a nonprofit hospital from taxation even though it did not provide free or below- 
cost services to the poor); Christiansen v. Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 529 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (holding that subscribers of health plan did not have standing to enforce the 
director's fiduciaIfduties). 
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eral's availability or effectiveness;" (4) the "nature of the benefited 
class and its relationship to the charity;" and ( 5 )  the "subjective and 
case-specific factual  circumstance^."^^^ The general rule, however, re- 
mains that, absent a statutory right, there is no private enforcement of 
a charitable trust, a nonprofit trust, or a nonprofit corporation. Nor 
does a member of the public have standing to sue. 
2. The Attorney General.-The attorney general usually has the re- 
sponsibility of supervision and oversight of charitable trusts and cor- 
porations, and may maintain such actions as appropriate to protect 
the public interest.299 In a few jurisdictions, this role is performed by 
the district or county attorney.300 Even before the enactment of the 
Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601, suits were brought by the attorney 
general to enforce charitable trusts.301 Unlike a private trust, the ben- 
eficial interest in a charitable trust does not reside in individual bene- 
ficiaries but in the community, an indefinite class. The property is 
devoted to the accomplishment of purposes beneficial to the commu- 
nity at large. By definition, the objective of the public benefit corpo- 
ration is to further the public interest. The attorney general 
represents the public in enforcing the purposes of the trust or corpo- 
ration. The common law duties of the attorney general reflected the 
expectations of society: there should be a single evolving duty to carry 
out the charitable purposes of the trust,302 that the trust property 
should be kept productive, and trustees should be prohibited from 
diverting charitable funds for improper purposes or ~elf-dealing.~'~ 
The common law principles asserted by the attorney general were car- 
ried over to America during the Colonial period.304 These precepts 
have been supplemented by statute in most jurisdictions. 
Today, the attorney general represents the state and the public, 
promoting accountability by charities and fiduciaries. The attorney 
298. Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 
61 (1993). 
299. CAL. COW. CODE §§ 5142(a)(5), 5250, 6511 (M'est 1990); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
COW. LAW § 112 (McKinney 1997); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. A m  $8 1.70,3.04(b)- 
(c),  8.10(a), 14.03.04. 
300. See Warren v. Bd. of Regents, 527 S.E.2d 563, 564 (Ga. 2000); Collins v. Citizens & 
S. Trust Co., 373 S.E.2d 612, 613 (Ga. 1988). 
301. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 24, § 391. 
302. Eric S. Tower, Directors' Duty to Obtain a Fair Price in the Conversion of Nonprofit Hospi- 
tals, 6 AVNALS HEALTH L. 157, 171 (1997). 
303. Marion FremontSmith, Trends in Accountability and Regulation of Nonprofits, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 75, 76 (1989); Hunter v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr. ( In  re 
Parkview Hosp.), 211 B.R. 619, 636 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997). 
304. See generally Office of the Ohio Attorney Gen., The Statw of State Regulation of Chari- 
table Trusts, Foundations, and Solicitations, in V RESEARCH PAPERS 2705, 2710 (1977). 
Heinonline - -  62 Md. L. Rev. 259 2003 
general has an enforcement or supervisory interest in property or in- 
come devoted to charitable uses, estates or trusts in which there is a 
charitable interest;305 may maintain registries of charitable trusts and 
trustees;306 and is an interested party in all proceedings affecting char- 
itable trusts, uses, and  estate^.^" The attorney general can institute 
proceedings in situations involving the state or public interest and can 
secure compliance with statutory norms or ensure proper administra- 
tion of The attorney general's jurisdiction extends to suits to 
protect charities where an attack is made on the organization's prop- 
erty3°9 or to protect against self-dealing, waste, and diversion of 
funds.310 
a. Specific Powers of the Attorney General.-The attorney gen- 
eral has the power to investigate, subpoena witnesses, and require pro- 
duction of books and records.311 In civil actions he can annul the 
corporate existence, dissolve corporations that have acted ultra vires, 
or restrain them from carrying out unauthorized activities.312 He may 
remove directors or trustees;313 dissolve corporations under applica- 
ble state procedures;314 enforce the rights of members, directors or 
 office^-s;315 bring proceedings and accounts for the assets of corpora- 
tions upon dissolution;316 supervise indemnification awards;317 and in- 
vestigate transactions and relationships of directors and trustees to 
determine whether property held or used by them has been allocated 
to charitable purposes.318 The attorney general may maintain an ac- 
tion against a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment; can bring a quo 
warranto proceeding to assure that absolute gifts to charitable corpora- 
305. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5142(a) (5), 5250 (West 1990). 
306. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § &1.4(c) (McKinney 2002). 
307. Brown v. Mem'l Nat'l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). 
308. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(m). 
309. See CAL. COW. CODE § 5142 (requiring that the attorney general be given notice 
and can intervene). 
310. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 5 720(a)-(b) (McKinney 1997) (explaining ac- 
tions that can be taken against directors or officers of a nonprofit corporation on behalf of 
the corporation). 
31 1. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(h) (i). 
312. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-1038 (1997). 
313. L. Edward Bryant, Jr., Responsibilities of Directors of NotlforProfit Cwporations Faced with 
Sharing Control with Other Nonprofit Organizations in Health Industrj Affiliations: A C o m m a t a ~  
on Legal and Practical Realities, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 139, 154 ( 1  998). 
314. David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitability: Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospi- 
tals, 16 AM. J.L.  & MED. 327, 346 (1990). 
315. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW § 720. 
316. Ebon Found., Inc. v. Oatrnan, 498 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ga. 1998). 
317. Champ v. Poelker, 755 S.M1.2d 383, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
318. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(h)(i) (McKinney 2002). 
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tions are applied according to the terms of gift;3'" must receive notice 
when suit is instituted by others;320 and is a necessary party to settle- 
ment of litigation where charitable beneficiaries are affected, where 
there is a sale of assets, or a change of use of assets is considered.'*' 
While the attorney general must receive notice of cases concerning a 
charity, there is no need to make him a party.322 The option to inter- 
vene lies with the attorney 
b. Information Gathering Responsibilities. -In many jurisdic- 
tions the attorney general has been given statutory authority for gath- 
ering information about charities and trustees. Charitable trusts and 
nonprofit corporations must register and file reports with his 
The Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act 
promulgated by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws in 
1954,325 has been adopted in whole or part in many jurisdictions. 
This statute requires registration of charitable trusts and charitable 
corporations with the attorney general, as well as periodic reporting to 
the attorney general who may institute appropriate proceedings, in- 
vestigate, supervise, and subpoena.32" While religious corporations 
and certain other charities may be excluded from filing requirements, 
the attorney general can subpoena religious groups suspected of 
fraudulent behavior.327 Other responsibilities of the attorney general 
typically include maintenance of a registry of all public benefit organi- 
zations, oversight of periodic filing requirements, and monitoring of 
financial filing requirements.328 
c. Oversight of Charitable Solicitation.-In most jurisdictions 
the attorney general is responsible for the oversight and enforcement 
of regulations dealing with charitable solicitation.329 This has become 
a major area of attorney general focus. Statutes have conferred upon 
the attorney general broad authority to protect the public and donors 
from deceptive and fraudulent solicitation practices or diversion or 
319. St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 306-07 (N.Y. 1939). 
320. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT. § 1.70 (1988). 
321. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, § 8A (1998); MINN. STAT. 3 501B.41 Subd. 4 (MTest 2002). 
322. In re Estate of Yablick, 526 A.2d 1134, 1136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
323. Bertram v. Berger, 274 N.E.2d 667, 670 (111. App. Ct. 1971). 
324. See ALA. CODE § 13A-9-71 (1994); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(~) (Mc- 
Kinney 2002). 
325. 7C U.L.A. 372 (2000). 
326. 7C U.L.A. 380-83. 
327. Abrams v. Temple of the Lost Sheep, Inc., 562 N.Y.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1990). 
328. See CAL. GOV. CODE § 12584 (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19 (2001). 
329. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.24 (Anderson 2001). 
Heinonline - -  62 Md. L. Rev. 261 2003 
waste of donated funds so as to ensure the proper use of contributed 
yp cally this includes moni- funds for the beneficiaries' benefit.330 T i 
toring and maintaining enforcement powers over registration require- 
ments for charities and professional fund raiser^.^^' 
d. Limitations on Attornqr General Authority.-Despite the au- 
thority to supervise charities, the attorney general does not have the 
power to manage charities in their everyday affairs.332 Thus, courts 
have prohibited the attorney general from intervening in suits con- 
testing wills involving charities,333 from ordering deviations from trust 
 provision^,^" or from enforcing obligations owing to charities.33" 
e. Standing for Others.--Other than the attorney general, 
only persons with a special and definite interest, such as directors, 
have standing to institute a legal action;336 the general public lacks 
such intere~t.~" If any member of the public could initiate suit, a 
director or trustee would frequently be subjected to unreasonable and 
vexatious litigation.338 
f: Obstacles to Enforcement.-Staffing problems and a relative 
lack of interest in monitoring nonprofits make attorney general over- 
sight more theoretical than deterrent. Only thirteen states have chari- 
ties sections within attorneys general offices.33g These states are home 
330. Gu. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17510.3 (West 1997) (requiring affirmative disclosures 
by donation solicitors). 
331. See id. 
332. Estate of Horton v. Bradley, 90 Cal. Rptr. 66, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (finding that 
the attorney general could not meddle in a charity's contractual agreements). 
333. SeeEstate of Roberts v. First Nat'l Bank, 373 P.2d 165, 174 (Kan. 1962); Kentucky ex 
rel. Ferguson v. Gardner, 327 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Ky. 1959). 
334. Midkiff v. Kobayashi, 507 P.2d 724, 745 (Haw. 1973). 
335. Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 415 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1980). 
336. Alison Manolovici Cody, Success in New Jersey: Using the Charitable Trust Doctrine to 
Preserve Women's Reproductive Services When Hospitals Become Catholic, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
Av. L. 323, 34748 (2000). 
337. Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). 
338. See BOCERT & BOCERT, s u p a  note 19, § 41 1; see also Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: 
Who (Else) Should Enfoce the Duties of Charitable Fiducian'es?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 659 (1998) 
(explaining that an expansion of standing may result in a variety of claims not necessarily 
involving fiduciary duties of charities as charities). For an interesting article suggesting 
that certain environmental organizations be granted statutory standing, see Karl S. Coplan, 
Direct Environmental Standing for Chartered Conservation Corporations, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y F. 183, 184 (2001). 
339. PETER SWORDS & HARRIET BOCRAD, NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILI~ REPORT AND REG 
OMMENDATIONS (Nonprofit Coordinating Comm. of N.Y., Inc. 1997), http:// 
www.charitychannel.com/forums/cyb-acc/resources/accrept.h~l (last visited Oct. 22, 
2002). 
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to fdty-five percent of United States charities and have sixty-five per- 
cent of national charitable revenues."' Except for New Hampshire 
and New Jersey, each of the thirteen states has at least three full-time 
attorneys."' Some states have incorporated multi-accountability func- 
tions within their attorney general's office. This includes: registration 
and reporting systems for organizations and for professional fun- 
draiser solicitors, enforcement programs used to protect charitable as- 
sets and deter fundraising abuse, educational programs that 
encourage responsible board governance and awareness of fundrais- 
ing fraud, and "oversight of charitable trusts or bequests."342 Some 
offices also oversee structural changes such as mergers. Many of these 
integrated offices budgets' are self-sustaining through administrative 
fees. A second frequent organizational pattern is that enforcement 
functions are divided from the registrational and reporting responsi- 
bilities. The attorney general handles enforcement, and another state 
body-the secretary of state, the consumer protection agency, or 
some other office-specifically deals with registration and licens- 
ing.343 The Swords-Bogard survey found that ten states have "no gen- 
eral system of registration and reporting for charities."344 
g. Inaccurate or Incomplete Data.-Information gathering re- 
sponsibilities and statutory oversight of charitable solicitation do not 
by themselves make the attorney general an active or efficient monitor 
of nonprofit organizations or improve charitable accountability. Most 
of the information filed is never reviewed by anyone.345 The data sub- 
mitted by the nonprofit can be manipulated. For example, Part I1 of 
Form 990, the annual federal information return, requires a listing of 
fundraising expenses. Studies by the Chronicle of Philanthropy and the 
Urban Institute's Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy have found 
that a substantial percentage of charities surveyed reported on their 
Form 990's that they incurred no fundraising costs, while comparable 
state filing records revealed that in fact the charity spent substantial 
amounts on f ~ n d r a i s i n g . ~ ~ ~  The General Accounting Ofice con- 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. 
344. Id (stating "Texas still has an actively staffed charities office within the state attor- 
ney general's office, and Iowa has an active program of prosecution of solicitation fraud"). 
345. See id. (noting that state regulators have limited resources and few problems are 
identified from repo;ting forms). 
346. The Chronicle found that for the 1996 tax year "more than one-fourth of the 4,889 
nonprofit organizations that received $500,000 or more in gifts from private sources re- 
ported spending nothing on fund raising." Holly Hall et al., Chanties' 7mdurn Filing Game, 
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cluded from an analysis of Form 990 data from 19941998 that, on 
average, sixty-four percent of charities claimed no fundraising 
expenses.347 
There are substantial incentives for charities to minimize fun- 
draising expenses. Charities will seem more efficient if they can show 
that they devote a greater percentage of spending to program services 
and a lesser percentage to general management and fundraising ex- 
penses."' It avoids discouraging potential donors who might rely on 
attorneys general or other organizations that suggest charities with 
fundraising costs over a certain percentage are wasteful. Because 
charities have discretion to allocate expenses, and there is overlap 
among the types of expenses, charities systematically minimize those 
costs that might make them seem less efficient.34g Many organizations 
justifiably believe that their fundraising efforts are educational in na- 
ture and allocate a percentage of costs to education.350 However, 
there is concern that charities systematically underreport fundraising 
expenses by "netting" such expenses against the total funds raised."' 
Often charities will dump fundraising costs into "other expenses. 9,352 
h. Limitations on Sharing Information.-Form 990 has become 
a major disclosure tool at the state level as the result of cooperation 
between the IRS, the National Association of State Charity Officials 
and the National Association of Attorneys General. The Form 990 is 
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 18, 2000, at 1 (emphasis added). The Urban Institute study 
examined computerized returns from the 1997 and 1998 tax years and found that "thirty- 
five percent of charities that received $500,000 to $1 million from private sources reported 
that they spent nothing on fundraising," as did thirty percent of those who raised between 
$1-5 million and nearly twenty-five percent who garnered more than $5 million. Id. 
347. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. The report also criticized the IRS for its failure to 
ensure the accuracy of expense data. Id. at 9-10. 
348. Id. at 8-9. Analysis of Form 990 data from 19941998 showed that charities typically 
apportioned 87 percent of their spending to charitable program services, 12 percent to 
general management expenses, and only 1 percent to fundraising costs. Id. Program ser- 
vices include providing goods and services to beneficiaries or members to fulfill the organi- 
zation's charitable purposes. Id. at 8 n.7. Fundraising activities encompass attracting 
donations. Id. General management expenses include "salaries, travel, professional fees, 
and other expenses." Id. 
349. Id. at 89 ,  15-16. 
350. See id. at 15. 
351. Id. at 9-10. An example of netting occurs when a charity contracts with a profes- 
sional fundraiser to garner donations. "The fundraiser might raise $250,000, charge the 
charity $150,000, and give the charity the remaining $100,000. When reporting to the IRS, 
the charity 'nets the fundraising expenses' by reporting $100,000 as a direct public contri- 
bution and does not report the $150,000 retained by the professional fundraiser. . . ," a 
violation of filing instructions. Id. 
352. Id. at 10. 
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acceptable to most state officials for purposes of filing an annual re- 
port in the majority of states requiring such a filing.'" However, 
there are substantial limitations on the ability of state and federal offi- 
cials to cooperate and share information. The IRS does not proac- 
tively share information with state officials on revocations or denials of 
tax-exempt Federal law protecting taxpayer privacy gener- 
ally prohibits the IRS from sharing data concerning charities.355 Even 
for data that the Service can share with the states (such as approval of 
applications or notice of revocation of tax-exempt status), the IRS has 
no procedures in place for regular sharing.'56 State and federal regu- 
lators have differing priorities in monitoring charitable accountability. 
Finding a balance between the need for taxpayer privacy and sharing 
information by state and federal regulators could improve state 
efforts. 
B. Patterns of Regulato7y Change 
Though the attorney general historically has been responsible for 
charities' accountability, because of a lack of resources, the IRS has 
become the primary regulator of nonprofit behavi~r.~" The IRS's Di- 
vision of Tax-Exempt and Government Entities is responsible for regu- 
latory oversight.35s Initially, it can screen nonprofit organizations 
when they apply for recognition of tax-exempt status.35g Thereafter, a 
small percentage of the Form 990 annual returns are examined.360 In 
the past decade the number of applicants has doubled.361 In 2001, 
58,938 applications were received requesting recognition of section 
501 (c) (3) Of those 10,548 were disposed of because the a p  
plicant did not submit a fee, did not submit all documents, or the 
application was withdrawn.363 Of the 42,366 complete applications 
353. Peter Swords, NonpoFt Accountability: The Sector's Response to Government Regulation, 
25 EXEMFT ORG. TAX REV. 413, 419 n.17 (1999). 
354. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 26-29. 
355. Id. at 26. 
356. Id. at 28. I.R.C. § 6103 prohibits public disclosure of tax return data save where 
explicitly permitted. I.R.C. § 6103 (2000). Congress has pushed for more public disclo- 
sure of nonprofit records. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 26-28. 
357. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
358. Id. at 23. 
359. Id. at 20. 
360. See id. at 23 (discussing that all applications need to be processed by IRS agents, 
and with an increasing application workload the resources for performing examinations 
has decreased). 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 21. 
363. Id. 
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submitted, only 58 were denied!"4 From 1996 through 2001, the 
number of Form 990 annual returns filed with the Service increased 
by twenty-five percent (286,000) while the number examined dropped 
fifteen percent (to 123'7).365 The percentage of charities examined 
annually has fallen from .73 in 1998 to .43 in 2001.366 The reasons for 
the decline are: changing Service priorities for other taxpayers, declin- 
ing resources, and shifting of agents from examinations to cope with 
the increased number of applications.367 This means that organiza- 
tions who fill out the application in boilerplate fashion automatically 
will obtain recognition of exemption. Ultimately, the Service's lack of 
scrutiny may affect grants and contributions available to new organiza- 
tions. Traditionally, the recognition of an exemption letter was a seal 
of approval to foundations and other donors. If the perception 
spreads that the I s ' s  scrutiny is pro forma, donor confidence will be 
affected."' Another way the Treasury Department and IRS en- 
courage accountability is through the publication of treasury regula- 
tions, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, technical memoranda, 
private letter rulings, continuing educational publications for I S  staff 
and general counsel memoranda. This serves to educate fiduciaries 
and organizations and has an important function in promoting ac- 
countability and proper behavior. In recent years the Service has 
sharply scaled back this educative function with the result that chari- 
ties and their counsel may not know what is appropriate in a particu- 
lar situation.369 
This is also a period of significant regulatory change. Tradition- 
ally, the IRS's focus has been upon issues related to the tax exemp- 
tion. The intermediate sanctions legislation370 has perhaps the 
unintentional result of preempting a traditional area of state regula- 
tion-oversight of the fiduciary duties of state chartered corpora- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  As an enforcement mechanism, in contrast to its role as a 
364. Id. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 22. 
367. Id. at 21-22. 
368. See Elizabeth Schwinn & Grant Williams, A Challage for the IRS: Lack of Fun& and 
Manpower Tax Agency k Ability to Regulate Charities, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 23, 2001, at 
1. 
369. Id. 
370. I.R.C. § 4958 (2000). 
371. It is curious that this development has occurred when other legal impulses are 
moving regulatory activity toward the state level. In convast to the federalization of chari- 
table oversight, a new federalism emphasizing states' rights and limiting the power of Con- 
gress to pass laws that bind the states has emerged since 1995 in a series of Supreme Court 
decisions. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that the civil 
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catalyst of normative change, its effectiveness is questionable. As yet, 
only two organizations, a medical organization in Mississippi and the 
Bishop Estate in Hawaii, have had taxes imposed under the legisla- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ '  The Internal Revenue Service itself has been forced to reor- 
ganize and to soften its previous aggressiveness, which may lead to a 
different approach to enf~rcement .~ '~  In 2000, Congress held hear- 
ings and indicated that it wished nonprofits and the IRS to publicize 
heretofore private information, such as private letter rulings, settle- 
ment agreements, and disciplinary actions.374 
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act is neither a valid regulation of inter- 
state commerce nor a proper means of enforcing equal protection guarantee of Four- 
teenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 566-68 (1995) (holding 
that "the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, . . . [which forbade] 'any individual know- 
ingly to possess a firearm at a place . . . [he] knows . . . is a school zone'" exceeded 
Congress's Commerce Clause powers). 
372. See Caracci v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 379,416 (2002) (holding that family members and 
directors of a Mississippi organization must return $5.2 million in assets and refusing to 
grant the family members and directors an excise tax abatement); Carolyn D. Wright, IRS 
Assesses Intermediate Sanctions Against the Bishop Estate Incumbent Tmtees, 31 EXEMPT ORG. 
TAX REV. 155 (2001). 
373. Internal Revenue Selvice Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105- 
206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.). 
374. Jennifer Moore & Grant M'illiams, Congressional Panel Urges Greater Disclosure of Non- 
Profit Data by IRS, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 10,2000. The Staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation has published a report in which the joint staff indicates that disclosure of 
information regarding tax-exempt organizations is appropriate "unless there are compel- 
ling reasons for nondisclosure that clearly outweigh the public interest in disclosure." 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 1 0 6 ~ ~  CONG., STUDY OFPRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER CONFI- 
D E h T I A L m  AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS A  REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE I N T E ~ A L  
REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCI-URING AND REFORM Am OF 1998, VOL. 11: STUDY OF DISCLOSURE 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 80 (Comm. Print 2000). Further- 
more, the efficiency of the tax-exempt sector will be improved by increased disclosure of 
information regarding these organizations by: "1) increasing public oversight of tax-ex- 
empt organizations; 2) increasing compliance with Federal tax and other applicable laws; 
3) promoting the fair application and administration of the federal tax laws; and 4) ad- 
vancing the policies underlying the Federal tax rules ~egarding said organizations." Id. at 
6. 
Among the Joint Committee s a s  recommendations are: "all written determinations 
(and background file documents) involving tax-exempt organizations should be publicly 
disclosedn including audits, closing agreements without redactions of the organization's 
name; applications for tax-exempt status of service action on it should be disclosed when 
the application is filed; Form 990 and related forms should be filed electronically after 
2002; disclosure should be made of Forms 990-T (Exempt Organization Business Income 
Return and Form 1120-POL). Id. at 7. Internal Revenue Code section 527 organizations 
should have to file annual returns even if they have no taxable income; tax-exempt organi- 
zations should be required to provide both their legal name and the name they do business 
under, their web sites, and more information over fund transfers between and among tax- 
exempt organizations, i d  at 9&98; and there should be increases in penalties for omissions 
and misrepresentation by preparers, as well as expended disclosure of returns to non-tax 
state officials or agencies such as the state attorney general. Id at 101-05. 
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Holding fiduciaries accountable through an efficient enforce- 
ment procedure is an ongoing problem. It has long been demon- 
strated that state attorney general offices have neither the person- 
power, nor sometimes the will, to monitor nonprofits effe~tively."~ In 
tk~e words of Professor Harvey Dale, a long-time observer of the non- 
profit world: 
[Glovernment regulators (and most particularly attorneys 
general, to whom the law confides the principal role in polic- 
ing charities) tend to allocate their scarce regulatory re- 
sources to other more politically potent portions of their 
domains. In most states, the Charity Bureau of the Attorney 
General is inactive, ineffective, overwhelmed, or some com- 
bination of these.376 
Leading commentators on the nonprofit sector have offered sug- 
gestions to improve nonprofit accountability. One, Joel Fleishman, a 
former law professor at Duke University and foundation president, 
has urged the creation of a new federal regulatory agency for policing 
the nonprofit sector.377 This is not a new recommendation. Professor 
Kenneth Karst suggested forty years ago, the creation of a new agency 
at the state level: a state board of private charities which would have 
primary responsibility for supervising private charities and for ad- 
ministering the various state controls over their operation.378 The 
question remains whether on a state or federal level, a new agency will 
be any more likely to gain sufficient funding to make it an effective 
monitor of charities. In addition, will the creation of another govern- 
ment agency without the clout of the attorney general or the IRS be 
likely to improve accountability? Both prospects are doubtful. 
Peter Swords, former President of the Nonprofit Coordinating 
Committee, an advocacy organization for charitable organizations, 
suggests that the sector advocate for "stronger generic oversight agen- 
cies," such as "stronger government regulatory agencies.""' He rec- 
375. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS A D GOVERNMENT 221-28 (1965) (dis- 
cussing tax inadequacies and the legislative attempts to solve them); Swords, supra note 
353, at 413; SWORDS & Bocrzm, supra note 339. 
376. Swords, supra note 353, at 413. 
377. See Fleishman, supra note 202, at 172, 187-88. Marcus Owens, former head of the 
IRS's Exempt Organizations Division, also reiterated that view with the caveat that unless 
Congress was willing to devote substantial new money and numbers of staff, it is unlikely 
there would be any significant improvement. Schwinn & Williams, supra note 368, at 28. 
378. Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: A n  Unfulfilled State Responsibil- 
ity, 73 H.~Rv. L. h v .  433, 47&83 (1960). 
379. Swords, supra note 353, at 413. 
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ommends that private nonprofit accountability groups work with state 
attorneys general and provide direct assistance to aid in meeting their 
goals, which does happen in several states.380 In addition, he suggests 
that nonprofit groups make the Form 990 more effective as an ac- 
countability tool and help with advocacy campaigns aimed at provid- 
ing more support for these agencies.381 Swords also outlines a series 
of collaborative efforts.382 Essentially, he promotes the idea of self- 
regulation with the securities industry as his 
Private groups can test, change, and improve norms.384 The test- 
ing of the meaning and roles of current norms is an important role of 
such private organizations that lie between the citizen and the state.385 
In the nonprofit sector there are many such associations-Indepen- 
dent Sector, The Nonprofit Coordinating Committee of New York, 
and The Council on Foundations-to name a few. The breadth of the 
nonprofit sector and its depth, that is, the members of organizations 
within each subset, are so vast that private groups cannot produce sec- 
tor-wide normative change on their own. Additionally, the history of 
self-regulation of the financial services sector in both the United King- 
dom and the United States demonstrates that self-regulation by an in- 
dustry is basically self-protection.386 The success of the self-regulatory 
bodies in the securities industry has been due to the threat, both im- 
plicit and explicit, that failure to regulate will bring harsher govern- 
mental sanction. In fact, over the years in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the securities statutory body has had to increase its 
authority over the self-regulating  organization^.^^' 
380. Id. at 416-17. 
381. Id. at 421. 
382. Id. at 423. 
383. See id. at 417 n.12 (noting the successful cooperation between the SEC and Self- 
Regulatory Organizations in policing the securities business). 
384. Sunstein, Social N m  and Social Roles, supra note 177, at  947. 
385. Id. 
386. Over the last sixty-five years the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
exerted increasing authority over self-regulatory organizations.  JA JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE 
TRANSFORMATION F THREADNEEDLE STREET: THE DEREGULATION A D REREGULATION OF 
BRITAIN'S FINANCIAL SERVICES 5455, 298-99 (1993) (noting the problems with self-regula- 
tion and praising the American approach, which authorizes the SEC to allocate examina- 
tion authority to SRO); David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and 
When? A Proposal to Allocate Regulatq  Responsibilitiesfm Securities Markets, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 527, 528-29 (1983) (describing the history of the SEC's intended regulatory role); see 
also Karen Talley, Leuitt Expects Wall Street to Fall Short,  ALL ST. J., July 24, 2001, at C13 
(noting that the former head of the SEC expects little from Wall Street's efforts to police 
itself). 
387. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 386, at 53334 (describing the expansion of the SEC's 
role). 
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A. The Potential of Technology for Improving Accountability: The Internet 
The internet offers enormous possibilities for improving account- 
ability and regulatory oversight, and has already had a substantial im- 
pact on charities who use their websites to advertise, sell, provide 
information, and raise More than anything else, the internet 
may increase the focus upon nonprofit fiduciary behavior. Every indi- 
vidual with access to the web can become a sentry of nonprofit behav- 
ior. It is now possible to scrutinize most charitable organizations with 
an intensity that seemed unimaginable even five years ago. Thus, 
while the formal regulatory regime has central i~ed,~~'  technology can 
move citizen oversight to a local fulcrum. While individuals cannot 
strip an organization of exemption or except in unusual situations, 
bring suit, the citizen-sentry can raise the alarm by withholding contri- 
butions, creating reputational damage, and alerting the press or a p  
propriate governmental officials. 
Though the internet presents a new level of transparency to char- 
itable operations, it does nothing in and of itself to improve the en- 
forcement of nonprofit fiduciary standards. In fact, the internet has 
exacerbated the problems of enforcement and accountability. No 
longer are nonprofits under the radar beam of critical scrutiny, but 
the lack of accountability and dearth of enforcement resources may 
further damage the reputation of the nonprofit sector. 
B. Increased Federal Disclosure and Inspection Mandates 
The development of the internet has coincided with a continuing 
effort by the federal government to make exempt organizations more 
accountable to the public. Congress has enacted and expanded a vari- 
ety of public disclosure and inspection requirements that apply to 
both the IRS and the organization. The IRS must make available for 
public inspection at the National Office and the appropriate field of- 
fices all Form 990s, section 501(c) (3) organizations' annual report 
and approved Form 1023 applications for e~ernpt ion.~ '~  
388. Thousands of charities' Form 990s can be viewed on line. See injra note 400 (pro- 
viding an illustration). 
389. See supra notes 257-276 and accompanying text (discussing the intermediate sanc- 
tions legislation, which regulates excessive benefits to insiders, traditionally a state 
function). 
390. I.R.C. 5 6104(a) (1) (A), (b) (2000). Trade secrets and information that would ad- 
versely affect national defense are exempt from disclosure, as is the schedule of major 
contributors that is required as an attachment to the Form 990. Id. § 6104(a) (1) (D) , (b) . 
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All  organization^^^' exempt from tax under sections '501 (c) or 
501 (d) must make available for inspection their application for ex- 
emption, along with all supporting documents,3y2 and their annual 
informational returns for the most recent three years.3g3 The docu- 
ments must be made available at the organization's principal office 
during regular business hours and at regional or district offices with 
three or more employees.3g4 Tax-exempt organizations also must pro- 
vide copies of their exemption applications and Form 990s for the 
three most recent tax years to anyone who requests them.3y5 The cop- 
ies ordinarily must be provided immediately if the request is made in 
person or within thirty days if in writing.3y6 
Organizations that make their documents "widely available," such 
as by posting an exact and downloadable reproduction on a world 
wide web site, are not required to provide photocopies, but they still 
must make returns available for inspection at their offices."' In ex- 
panding the disclosure requirements, Congress was mindful that some 
highly visible charities would be the target of harassment campaigns, 
and it authorized the IRS to issue regulations providing relief in ap- 
propriate cases.3y8 
Additionally, the IRS is in the process of putting information re- 
turns of all section 501 (c) (3) organizations on CD-ROMs for sale to 
the public on a subscription basis.3y9 The Guidestar Directory of Phil- 
anthropic Research, Inc. already posts information of thousands of 
charities on its web page.400 However, full transparency is but half of 
the issue. An accountability system is only as good as its enforcement 
mechanism.401 Unless an effective enforcement mechanism is tied to 
391. Private foundations are subject to similar disclosure and inspection requirements. 
Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-1 to (d)-3 (2002). 
392. I.RC. 8 6104(d) (1) (A) (ii). 
393. Id. 5 6104(d) (1) (A) (i), (d) (2). 
394. Id § 6104(d) (1) (A). 
395. Id. § 6104(d) (1) (A) (ii)-(iii), d(2). 
396. Id § 6104(d)(l)(B). Under prior law, requestors could only inspect thesedocu- 
ments at the organization's office and had no right to demand copies. Now if a copy is 
requested, the organization may charge for reasonable copying and mailing costs. Treas. 
Reg. § 301.6104(d)-1 (d) (3) (i). 
397. I.R.C. § 6104(d) (4); Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-2. 
398. SeeLR.C. 5 6104(d) (4). These regulations define a harassment campaign as "a sin- 
gle coordinated effort to disrupt the operations of a tax-exempt organization, rather than 
to collect information about the organization." Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-3(b). 
399. See David Cay Johnston, Tax Return of Chanties to be Posted on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 18, 1999, at C1 (noting that The Urban Institute gave the IRS nearly $1 million over 
five years, beginning in 1999, to scan charity returns onto CD-ROMs). 
400. See http://www.guidestar.org (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
401. Swords, supra note 353, at 413. 
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the transparency provided by the internet, the advantage of additional 
scrutiny is minimized. 
It is doubtful that there will be a substantial increase in funding 
for enforcement activity at either the federal or state levels. The only 
realistic way to increase nonprofit accountability and to create new 
norms of fiduciary behavior is to leverage existing regulators' efforts 
by making them more efficient, and in a variant of Swords's and 
Fleishman's more general proposals, to use private citizens in the ser- 
vice of state attorneys general. It is better for the nonprofit sector and 
for the efficiency of regulation for its locus to be at the state rather 
than federal level. Almost all charities are incorporated at the state 
level and have state domiciles. Historically, fiduciary norms have been 
matters of state law. Moreover, at the state or a more local level, regu- 
lation is at a more meaningful scale where members of the charity's 
community can monitor, educate, and put into play the legal mecha- 
nisms that institute accountability. Professor Sunstein has suggested 
that "it is probably best to have a presumption in favor of the lowest 
possible level of government [because] it is closest to the people, and 
in that sense most responsive to it and most likely to be trusted."402 
Local efforts are more responsive to our constitutional structure of 
federalism, which increased federal regulation undermines. 
This proposal recommends the creation of advisory commissions 
under the ultimate supervision of the state attorney general. The ad- 
visory commission structure and procedure, which will be set forth 
below, has some similarities to a commission procedure established 
under the seminal Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601,403 and to con- 
temporary lawyer and judicial disciplinary bodies. 
A. Proposed Charity Commission Procedures 
To harness the transparency offered by the internet, local charity 
commissions should be the initial filter for citizen complaints. The 
commissions would serve under the control and guidance of the state 
attorney general. In states with a substantial number of charities such 
as New York or California, charity commissions could be established 
on the basis of state judicial divisions. Thus, New York, having four 
appellate divisions, would have four charity commissions. The charity 
402. Sunstein, Social N m  and Social Roles, supra note 177, at 952. 
403. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). 
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commissions would be public-private partnerships which would be im- 
bued with a legal and moral authority that a wholly private body or 
state agency could not engender. They also could serve an educa- 
tional or remedial, norms inculcation function more easily than a gov- 
ernmental enforcement agency alone. 
Each charity commission would consist of fifteen unpaid citizens, 
eight appointed by the governor and seven by the attorney general.404 
Some would be individuals experienced in the nonprofit sector or 
beneficiaries of nonprofit organizations' activities. Others would be 
members of the general public. The chief administrator of each com- 
mission would be an assistant attorney general.40" Commissioners 
would be appointed for three-year terms, which would be renewable 
once.406 
A person could complain about a charity or its official, and she 
would provide to the commission or its staff information to validate 
the allegations. The commission would have the powers to investi- 
gate, hold hearings, and subpoena witnesses and evidence. Thereaf- 
ter, it could issue a report exonerating the charity or individual, 
resolve the problem by working with the charity, recommend the 
charity to a service organization that might provide assistance, or turn 
the matter over to the attorney general for routine prosecution. This 
remedial function could be the most important effect of the charity 
commission process, for cumulatively it could inculcate new sector- 
wide norms of behavior. 
When a complaint comes into the charity commission, a panel of 
three commissioners, randomly selected, would review the allegations 
and the evidence. If the charges were in any way colorable, the allega- 
tions and evidence would be turned over by the commission to the 
assistant attorney general who would promptly serve a copy of the 
complaint on the accused organization or individual or any other nec- 
essary parties and make a preliminary investigation. The assistant at- 
torney general will determine whether the charity commission or the 
attorney general should have jurisdiction over the matter alleged. If 
she has probable cause to believe the allegations to be true, the assis- 
tant attorney general would be responsible for initially subpoenaing 
404. There is precedence for such cooperation. In New York, the Governor and Attor- 
ney General can appoint a deputy attorney general to head an organized crime task force. 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 70-a(2) (McKinney 2002). 
405. The attorney general and other agencies could loan officials, but the legislature 
should appropriate a sum for maintenance of the office. 
406. For the initial appointment of the commissioners, five would be appointed for 
three years, five for two years and five for one year, thereby creating a staggered board. 
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witnesses and evidence which would be presented to the three-person 
commission. Allegations of wrongdoing would be heard by the three 
commissioners, who could dismiss the charge, seek additional infor- 
mation, or place the matter before the full commission. 
In the words of Judge Learned Hand, "indictments are calamities 
to honest men."*07 This is also true for charities. Public investigations 
are disasters for a charity's reputation. Thus, commission investiga- 
tions and hearings would be confidential, and a prime role of the 
charity commissions shall be to engage in settlement, conciliation, 
and remediation if necessary, to remove the force of the allegations. 
It is assumed that many wrongdoings of charities flow out of nonfea- 
sance or ignorance. The three-person commissions could provide di- 
rection and assistance in bringing the charity into compliance with 
procedures, mandates, or law. Under the resolution process, the char- 
ity and the commission would sign a settlement agreement whereby 
the charity would admit any wrongs, indicate changes it will make to 
bring itself into compliance, and agree to present a report within 
twelve months of the agreement date outlining the implementation of 
the suggested changes. These proceedings and settlement would not 
be made public. 
If a settlement cannot be reached or there is probable cause for 
the allegations, the three panel commissions will elect, by majority 
vote, to turn the matter to the full commission for a hearing. The 
hearing before the full commission also shall be in camera. The organ- 
ization or individual (hereinafter called "respondent") may file a writ- 
ten answer and appear with or without counsel. If the respondent 
fails to appear, a default judgment shall be entered, and the matter 
will be turned over to the attorney general for enforcement. 
Upon the conclusion of the hearing by the full commission, the 
matter could be dismissed, settled, or an order could be issued requir- 
ing the respondent to take certain steps to implement compliance, 
pay costs of investigation, and provide a compliance report. If the 
commission finds the respondent innocent of such charges, it shall 
issue an order dismissing those findings which shall also be transmit- 
ted to the attorney general. This report shall not be made public. If 
the full commission finds the allegations are correct and no settle- 
ment has been reached or order complied with, the matter shall be 
turned over to the attorney general who will handle it as part of its 
normal oversight of charities. 
407. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
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When an individual or an organization is summoned before a 
three-member panel or the full commission, it may challenge the pres- 
ence of any of the commissioners for a conflict of interest. If such 
conflict is found by the other members of the commission, the partic- 
ular commissioner must recuse herself from hearing the matter. An- 
nually, the charities commissions shall issue a report summarizing the 
number of matters brought to it and their method of disposition. 
An underlying assumption of these advisory charity commissions 
is that local enforcement by citizens in the community is the most 
efficient and effective method of providing accountability and for pro- 
viding support and encouragement of the charitable sector. There 
are current analogies in the areas of attorney and judicial discipline 
that are useful in terms of procedure and the litigation of private citi- 
zens backed by the authority of the state. 
B. Three Analogies to the Proposed Charity Commissions 
1.  Charity Commission Procedures Under the Statute of Charitable 
Uses.-The Statute of Charitable Uses4'' was a seminal development 
in the law of philanthropy and remains important today. Its roots lay 
in the inadequacy of the existing Chancery Court procedure to ensure 
fiduciary accountability. It also complemented the Poor Law passed 
the same year.40g In order to encourage philanthropic aid to the 
poor, some effective system of oversight had to be created.410 Though 
the Statute's preamble subsequently became more famous, the legisla- 
tion primarily created a procedure for the efficient administration of 
charitable trusts and bequests, which, heretofore, had been lacking.411 
Additionally, it codified and extended the legal underpinning of the 
charitable trust and solidified the role of the Chancellor in overseeing 
charitable assets.412 The preamble, which undertook the recital of the 
408. The Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). 
409. An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601,43 Eliz., c. 2 (Eng.). Relief of the poor paid 
by taxes at the parish level would come into play only if private donations failed to meet 
the need. 
410. S e e J o ~ ~ s ,  supra note 8, at 21-22 (explaining that "[w] hat was needed was a general 
procedure which would supplement the traditional Chancery procedure, which would . . . 
protect charity and which would ensure the application, in accordance with the intent of 
the donors, of those charitable uses . . ."). 
411. Id. at 12-13, 25. The preamble became the source for the common law definition 
of "charitable" activity. See 38 PARL. DEB. (1st ser.) (1818) 603. 
412. The statute remained on the books until 1888, but the successor statute preserved 
the preamble's definitions of charitable activity as has the case law. See Comm'r of Income 
Tax. v. Pemsel, [I8911 1 A.C. 531,532 (holding that "charitable purposesn were wider than 
just those that gave relief to the poor). 
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proper objects of charitable interest, eventually became the source for 
the scope of meaning of the word "~haritable."~~" 
The Statute provided for an administrative procedure that ena- 
bled the crown "to initiate and sustain a thorough investigation of 
charitable uses [to ensure] that their endowments might be 'duly and 
faithfully employed' in accordance with the intent of the donors."414 
It created inquisitory procedures whereby five commissioners "were 
appointed to inquire into 'any breach of trust, falsity, non-employ- 
ment, concealment, or conversion' of charitable funds" in the county 
specified within their commission.415 Thus, the investigation oc- 
curred at the local and it required a strong and effective par- 
ish government. Parishioners were invited to furnish evidence of 
breaches known to them, and the commissioners, on the inquisition 
of a jury, would issue a decree correcting any breach.417 An appeal 
subsequently could be lodged with the C h a n ~ e l l o r . ~ ~ ~  
Once the decree was issued, the local parishes of the county were 
given notice of the commission and encouraged to bring with them 
any evidence necessary to address their allegations that charitable 
property had been misu~ed.~" According to Professor Gareth Jones, 
the notice served as an encouragement for parishioners to report "to 
the commissioners breaches of trust of which they were aware" and 
bring the documents necessary to "substantiat[e] their allegations."420 
The procedure under the statute encouraged local monitoring, inves- 
413. JONES, supra note 8, at 25. 
414. Id. at 22-23. 
415. Id. One of the five commissioners had to be a bishop. Id. at 40. The other com- 
missioners had to be "'persons of sound or good behavior' who, if not Justices of the 
Peace, were invariably gentlemen of the country." Id. (footnotes omitted). One could not 
be a commissioner, however, if there was any interest or claim in the property that was the 
subject of the investigation. Id. at 40, 42. 
416. Id. at 41-42. The leading exposition of the statute was by Francis Moore, a member 
of the House of Commons and drafter of the legislation. Id. at  27-31. His "Readingn or 
lectures to the students of Gray's Inn is the leading contemporary analysis of the proce- 
dure. The "Readingn is reprinted in GEORGE DUKE, THE LAW OF CHARITABLE USES, C. VII 
(London, W. Clarke & Sons, 1805) (1676). Professor Jones has used and relied on 
Moore's analysis. JONES, supra note 8, at 27-31. 
417. JONES, supra note 8, at 41 
418. Id. at 45. If the charitable use was not within the statute's preamble, an alleged 
abuse would be prosecuted at common law in the name of the attorney general or by an 
original bill brought by an individual with standing. Id. at 33. Charitable uses not within 
the statute included lands, rents, etc., given to certain colleges, towns, and schools as well 
as most religious uses. Id. at 27-31. 
419. Id. at 41. 
420. Id. 
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tigation, and ultimately punishment or a remedy that would be locally 
applied.421 
If there was evidence of mis- or non-feasance, a warrant was then 
issued to the sheriff of the county requiring the assemblage of a 
According to Professor Jones, "[a] t the hearing, . . . the com- 
mission would be read, the sheriff would return his writ summoning 
the jury, [and] the jury [then] would be [charged]."423 Interested 
parties would make their challenges to the Thereafter, the 
jury would be sworn to inquire what property had been devolved to 
charitable uses enumerated in the preamble to the statute and what 
breaches of trust had been committed.425 It would hear evidence, 
find in the inquisition "the gift," and any negligence or misemploy- 
ment of that gift.426 Based on the inquisition by the commissioners, a 
decree was returned "into the Court of Chancery within the time spec- 
ified in the original commission."427 The commissioners' extensive 
powers "were directed to ensuring that property devoted to . . . chari- 
table uses . . . was employed in accordance with the intention of the 
donors."428 Their powers were limited only by good faith.42g Parties 
aggrieved by the commissioners' findings could appeal by bill to the 
Ck~ancellor.~" The commissioners seemed a combination of grand 
421. Id. at 47. The chancellor, for example, had authority to impose fees against those 
who had complained "without just and sufficient cause" and award costs to their oppo- 
nents. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). 
422. JONES, supra note 8, at 44. The sheriff would summon the churchwardens and of- 
ficers of the parishes, and all interested parties. I d  According to Moore, an interested 
party was described as: 
[one] who . . . would be affected either directly or  indirectly by the commission- 
ers' decree . . . includ[ing] a donor; the donor's heirs, feoffees or executors; a 
grantee of the land charged with a charitable use, or  his heirs; a person who had 
power to nominate charitable uses under the trust, and the Ordinary[-a bishop 
or  other ecclesiastic in his capacity as an ex officio ecclesiastical authority,] if he . . . 
[who had given rise] to a charitable use, die[d] intestate. 
Id. at 4243 ( f ~ ~ t n o t e s  omitted). Interested parties could also challenge the commissioners 
and the jurors. Id. at 43. This distinguished the act of 1601 from its predecessor, the 
Charitable Uses Act of 1597, 39 Eliz., c.6 (Eng.), which did not explicitly allow for any 
challenge to jurors. I d  The absence of the right to challenge was the principal reason it 
was not renewed. For allowable challenges, see DUKE, supra note 416, at 14451. 
423. JONES, supra note 8, at 44 (footnote omitted). 
424. Id. at 43. 
425. Id. at 44-45. 
426. Id. at 44. 
427. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
428. Id. at 47. 
429. Id.; see alro DUKE, supra note 416, at 152-66. 
430. JONES, supra note 8, at 45. The appeal had to be in writing "excepting . . . to the 
commissioners' order and decree. To these exceptions, the [opposing] . . . party. . . could 
furnish written answers." Id. After hearing the exceptions, the Chancellor could use his 
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jury and master, rather than a substitute for the attorney general.431 
They always were subject to the supervision of the Chancellor who, 
with the advice of common law judges, determined the powers of the 
commissioners.432 The commissioners assured that charitable assets 
were applied to their proper use. 
From 1597 to 1625, over one thousand decrees involving charita- 
ble trusts were issued as compared to one or two made by the Chan- 
cellor annually from 1400-1 601 .433 Professor Jones suggests that the 
commissioners' success was due to the Chancellor's support of the 
procedure, the support of the parish community, and the fact that the 
hearings were This may be a message for the present-local 
monitoring. 
In the period of the English Civil War and Interregnum (1640- 
1660), there were far more important issues to be resolved than the 
proper use of charitable assets, and utilization of the charity commis- 
sion procedure declined.435 Though a short revival occurred from 
1670 to 1688,436 another procedure came into private use. Instead of 
the commission procedure which depended upon the energy and 
good will of neighbors, petitioners on behalf of charities now used the 
"information," an appeal to the attorney Thereupon, the 
attorney general as relator sought to enforce charitable trusts on be- 
half of an aggrieved individual or charity through an action in Chan- 
equity powers in fashioning a decree-ordering specific performance, restitution, or 
charging interest. Id. at 46. There was no appeal from an action of the Chancellor be- 
cause the decree was by order of Parliament. Id. The commissioners could require the 
"feoffees," the beneficiaries of the trust, "to pay costs to . . . person[s] who successfully 
prosecuted the reform of the charitable trust" and to successful exceptants. Id. at 46-47. 
M'hile they could limit the charitable use to comply with the donor's intent, the commis- 
sioners could not change it or exercise powers of cy pes or exercise the variance power. Id. 
at 49-50. 
431. Id. at 4651. 
432. Id. at 51. 
433. Id. at 52. 
434. Id. at 52-53. 
435. See DAVID OWEN, ENGLISH PHILANTHROPY 1660-1960, at 85 (1964). 
436. Because the docket books were destroyed, it is difficult to accurately estimate the 
use of the commission procedure up to 1643, but for the next century the figures are 
precise and show a steady decline: 16431660: 295; 1660-1678: 344; 1678-1700: 197; '1700- 
1746: 125; 1746-1760: 3; 1760-1818: 6; and after 1787: 0. Id. (citing Lord Brougham in 
Parliament, 38 PARL. DEB. (1st ser.) (1818) 60647). 
437. JONES, supa note 8, at 36 (stating "each information . . . set out reasons why the 
particular charity was . . . relievable [by the court]). 
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~ e r y . ~ "  This was felt to be a more efficient procedure, and the 
commission procedure fell into 
2. Attorney Discipline.-The hearings by a charity commission are 
a form of disciplinary proceeding. Attorney disciplinary procedures 
provide a partial, albeit imperfect analogy to the proposed charity 
commissions.440 They involve governmental-private partnerships with 
the supreme court of the jurisdiction ultimately responsible for attor- 
ney discipline in partnership with the bar and the Although 
state procedures, effectiveness, record keeping, and application of 
standards differ widely,442 attorney discipline provides guidance on 
the need for procedural protection and privacy as well as the aims of 
such sanctions. Discussed herein are the Model Rules for Lawyer Dis- 
ciplinary Enforcement and New York Law; although, other jurisdic- 
tions easily could be substituted. 
Under the Model Rules, the highest court of the state has respon- 
sibility for lawyer discipline, which is delegated to a statewide discipli- 
nary agency with a statewide board.443 The board should have 
appropriate diverse representation of all members of the 
The New York Judiciary Law provides that the Supreme Court has 
"power and control over attorneys" and grants to the Appellate Divi- 
sion of the Supreme Court in each of the four judicial departments 
the authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings relating to attor- 
438. Id. By this time, many of the commission proceedings wound up in Chancery on 
appeal, so one of the initial advantages, an expeditious hearing, was lost. OWEN, supra note 
435, at 85. The last commission, used in 1787, was not executed until 1803. Id. The next 
year, "Chancery was petitioned to confirm the commissioner's decree. But exceptions 
were taken," and it took four years before the case was submitted to the court for decision. 
Id. Then, Lord Chancellor (Eldon) sat on the case for a decade. Id 
439. JONES, supra note 8, at 55. 
440. The scope of attorney discipline is much larger than the caseload expected for 
charity commissions. In 1996, state lawyer disciplinary committees reported 118,891 com- 
plaints with about five percent of the complaints resulting in sanctions. ABA CTR. FOR 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILIIY, STANDING COMM. ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCI- 
PLINE SYSTEMS 1996, at 4 (1998). Ten states did not provide data. Id. In 1998, in New 
York's First Department, which encompasses Manhattan and Bronx counties, stated that in 
1998 there were 953 complaints to the disciplinary committee resulting in 28 disbarments, 
47 suspensions, and twelve public censures. DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE 
APP. DIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 36, 43 (1999) [hereinafter DISCIPLI- 
NARY COMM. ANNUAL REPORT]. 
441. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 2(A)-(B) (1996). 
442. See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperur's Clothes and Other T a b  About the Standards 
for Imposing LaruyerDiscipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U .  L. REV. 1 (1998) (providing an overview of 
the goals and standards of attorney discipline). 
443. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 2 cmt. 
444. Id. 
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n e y ~ . ~ ~ ~  As is common in mostjurisdictions, a court, (in New York the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court), appoints a Departmental 
Disciplinary Committee, which has the responsibility of investigating, 
prosecuting, and disciplining matters involving alleged misconduct by 
attorneys and law firms.446 The court, along with the Departmental 
Disciplinary Committee, then selects a chief counsel and necessary 
staff.447 
The primary purpose of attorney discipline proceedings, along 
with the charity commission proposal, is protection of the 
At the same time, the disciplinary process stands ready to defend at- 
torneys against unmerited charges.44g The charity commission will 
serve a similar role for nonprofit organizations. Because disciplinary 
procedures are civil in nature, the full panoply of procedural due pro- 
cess rights do not apply, but an accused attorney has the right to no- 
tice of charges, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to be 
represented by counsel.450 
A disciplinary counsel initially evaluates a complaint with notice 
to the respondent.451 Upon conclusion of an investigation, the disci- 
plinary counsel may dismiss the complaint; refer a respondent to an 
Alternatives to Discipline Program; or recommend probation, admo- 
nition, formal charges, transfer to disability inactive status, or a stay.452 
In New York, the initial investigation is undertaken by the Office of 
445. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 2002). In New York, the Supreme Court is the 
basic court forjurisdiction. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is the intermedi- 
ate court of appeal and the Court of Appeals is New York's highest court. 
446. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.4 (2002). At least ttvo-thirds of the 
committee must be attorneys. Id. Appointment is for a three-year term. Id. After appoint- 
ment for two consecutive terms, a member is not re-eligible for reappointment for one 
year. Id. 
447. Id. 
448. Mitchell v. Ass'n of the Bar, 351 N.E.2d 743, 745 (N.Y. 1976) (noting the public 
protection aspect of disbarment proceedings). 
450. Each of the four New York Appellate Divisions has rules for the establishment of 
disciplinary committees whose charge it is to investigate instances of professional miscon- 
duct. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 605 (2002) (providing rules for the 
First ~ e ~ a r t & e n t ) .  Charges made in a letter to a grievance commitiee are absolutely privi- 
leged. See i n . a  notes 463471 and accompanying text (discussing confidentiality). Com- 
plaints of alleged attorney misconduct must be in writing and contain a concise statement 
of the facts. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 605.6(b). In connection with the 
investigation, the Committee may obtain subpoenas for the attendance of persons or the 
production of books and records. Id. 5 605.13. 
451. MODEL RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 15(b). 
452. Id. R. 11. 
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Chief Counsel of the Disciplinary C~mmittee.~" Except where there 
is no basis for proceeding, the Office of Chief Counsel transmits no- 
tice to the respondent advising her of the nature of the grievance and 
her right to state her position with respect to the allegations.454 Fol- 
lowing the investigation of the complaint, the office of the chief coun- 
sel may recommend: (1) referral to another body because of lack of 
jurisdiction; (2) dismissal; (3) admonishment;455 or (4) formal pro- 
ceedings before a hearing 
If after the investigation, it is determined that there is reason to 
believe that professional misconduct has occurred, the Office of Chief 
Counsel institutes a formal disciplinary proceeding, and serves written 
charges of misconduct against the attorney, and requests the court to 
appoint a referee or hearing At the hearing all relevant evi- 
dence is admissible; the committee and respondent can summon wit- 
nesses and require production of books and papers.458 Hearings are 
closed to the If any of the charges are sustained, the hear- 
ing panel may: (1) issue a reprimand; (2) refer the matter to the court 
with a recommendation as to censure, suspension, or disbarment; or 
(3) issue a reprimand and refer the matter to the court with a recom- 
mendation as to censure, suspension or disbarment, and a recommen- 
dation as to restitution or In most Departments the 
committee alternatively may issue an admonition in those instances 
where the professional misconduct does not warrant referral to a 
453. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 605.6(a). In the First Department, the com- 
plaint will be screened by a senior staff attorney who makes a preliminary recommendation 
as to whether the matter should be referred to another public agency or disciplinary com- 
mittee, rejected, or  investigated further. Id  § 605.6(e). 
454. Id. § 605.6(d). 
455. Id. § 605.6(e) (1)-(3). In the Second Department, a letter of admonition is issued 
when an investigation reveals that a lawyer has violated the Code of Professional Responsi- 
bility but not seriously enough to warrant a more severe sanction. Id. § 691.6(a). Although 
a letter of admonition is private and confidential, it becomes part of the lawyer's perma- 
nent disciplinary record. Id. 5 691.6(b). 
456. Id. § 605.6. All First Department dismissal recommendations are reviewed by a de- 
partmental disciplinary committee member. Id. § 605.6(f) (2). 
457. Id. § 605.12. In the First Department, the matter would be assigned to a referee 
who would present a report to a hearing panel. I d  § 605.13. 
458. Id. §§ 605.13, 605.17. In the First Department, the Hearing Panel does not con- 
duct the evidentiary hearing but reviews the full record of the proceedings as well as the 
Referee's Report and Recommendation. Id. § 605.14. It then deliberates and issues a re- 
port containing its determination. Id. § 605.14(g). 
459. See N.Y. JUD. LAW 5 90(10) (McKinney 2002). 
460. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 605.13. 
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The committee may issue a letter of caution when it is be- 
lieved that the attorney acted in a manner which, while not constitut- 
ing clear professional misconduct, involved behavior requiring 
comment.462 
a. Confidentiality.-The Model Rules provide confidentiality 
only until a finding of probable cause at which point records and pro- 
ceedings become However, "[dlisability proceedings re- 
main confidential until the final order of the The 
justification for waiving confidentiality is that "once a finding of prob- 
able cause exists, there is no longer a danger that the allegations 
against the respondent are frivol~us."~~" 
Section 90(10) of the New York Judiciary Law provides strict stan- 
dards for confidential treatment of attorney discipline proceedings.466 
The statute mandates that attorney disciplinary documents be deemed 
"private and confidential," unless for cause shown the Appellate Divi- 
sion determines to divulge some or all of the record, until after a judi- 
cial determination that public discipline is in order.467 Though there 
have been periodic efforts in New York to institute a fully-public disci- 
461. See, e.g., id. § 603.9 (explaining admonishments in the First Department). The Sec- 
ond Department considers a reprimand to be discipline imposed by the committee after a 
hearing. Id. § 691.6. 
462. See id. § 691.6 (noting the Second Department's admonishment process). An attor- 
ney has the right to request a hearing upon receiving a letter of caution or an admonition. 
Id. 
463. MODEL RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 16 (1996). 
464. Id. cmt. 
465. Id. 
466. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(10) (McKinney 2002). New York law provides: 
Any statute or rule to the contrary notwithstanding, all papers, records and docu- 
ments upon the application or examination of any person for admission as an 
attorney and counselor at law and upon any complaint, inquiry, investigation or  
proceeding relating to the conduct or discipline of an attorney or attorneys, shall 
be sealed and be deemed private and confidential. However, upon good cause 
being shown, the justices of the appellate division having jurisdiction are empow- 
ered, in their discretion, by written order, to pennit to be divulged all or any part 
of such papers, records and documents. In the discretion of the presiding or 
acting presiding justice of said appellate division, such order may bemade eiiher 
without notice to the persons or attorneys to be affected thereby or upon such 
notice to them as he may direct. In furtherance of the purpose of this subdivi- 
sion, said justices are also empowered, in their discretion, from time to time to 
make such rules as they may deem necessary. Without regard to the foregoing, in 
the event that chargesare sustained by th; justices of the appellate division hav- 
ing jurisdiction in any complaint, investigation or proceeding relating to the con- 
duct or discipline of any attorney, the records and documents in relation thereto 
shall be deemed public records. 
Id. 
467. Id. 
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plinary process after a formal complaint has been made,468 and other 
jurisdictions permit public access when complaints are dismissed 
before formal charges,46g New York has made no move to provide 
such access. There are similar confidentiality policies governing other 
New York statutes that regulate professions.470 
However, in a majority of states open proceedings occur at an 
early time in the disciplinary process-when a determination to bring 
formal charges has been made.471 If this model was applied to the 
proposed charity commission procedure, formal charges referred to 
the attorney general would presumably become public. This may not 
be as beneficial in the nonprofit sector, because the organization may 
be an innocent party and publicity could be disastrous for the organi- 
zation. Therefore, the New York approach may be more suitable. 
3. State Commissions on Judicial Conduct.-Another useful ana- 
log/89 to the proposed attorney general's charity commission is state 
commissions of judicial conduct. Commissions of judicial conduct of- 
fer a forum for citizens with conduct-related complaints, and a means 
of disciplining judges who transgress ethical con~traints .~ '~ Though 
the Model Rules on Judicial Conduct and the New York State Commis- 
sion on Judicial Conduct are used as examples, all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia have adopted a commission system to meet the 
above-mentioned goals.47" 
a. The Model Rules.-The Model Rules for Judicial Discipli- 
nary Enforcement promulgated by the American Bar Association 
Center for Professional Responsibility and State Justice Institute are 
similar in structure to the Lawyer Disciplinary Rules. They envisage 
the creation of a Commission on Judicial Conduct composed of twelve 
members, from judges appointed by the state's highest court, four 
members of the bar appointed by the state bar association, and four 
non-lawyer members of the public appointed by the governor.474 The 
468. See Ass'n Bar City New York Comm. on Prof l Discipline, The Confidentiality of Disci- 
plinaly Proceedings, 47 Rec. 48, 49-52 (1992). 
469. See Sadler v. Or. State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218, 1220-21 (Or. 1976) (finding state public 
records law applicable to bar association records of complaints against attorneys). - 
470. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6510(e) (McKinney 2001) (providing liberal disclosure); N.Y. 
JUD. LAW 5 44(4) (McKinney 2002) (discussing the confidentiality of hearings of judges); 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(11)(a) (McKinney 2002) (discussing the confidentiality of 
investigations of professional medical conduct investigations). 
471. Comm. On Prof1 Discipline, supa note 468, at 51. 
472. MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 2(B) (2) (1999). 
473. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON JUDICLAL CONDUCT, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2001). 
474. MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 2(C). 
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Model Rules provide for the appointment of a disciplinary counsel 
who conducts preliminary investigations, conducts full investigations, 
and after an investigative panel so determines, files formal charges.475 
Disciplinary counsel also serves as a filter to screen The 
Commission is divided into hearing panels which inter alia "review the 
recommendations of disciplinary counsel after full investigation and 
approve, disapprove, or mod* the  recommendation^."^^^ The rules 
separate the investigative and adjudicative factors by having separate 
panels.478 In the case of the charity commission, there is not a formal 
separation but a referral to the attorney general if there is to be adju- 
dicative proceedings. As with the Lawyer Disciplinary Rules, confiden- 
tiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings ends with the filing of 
formal charges on grounds of "the public's right to know."479 
6.  N m  York Procedures.-The New York State Commission on 
Judicial Conduct is composed of eleven members serving four-year 
terms.480 Four are appointed by the governor, three by the Chief 
Judge of the Court of Appeals (New York State's highest court), and 
one each by each of the four leaders in the legislature.481 The Com- 
mission has the authority to receive and review written complaints of 
misconduct against judges, initiate complaints on its own motion, con- 
duct investigations, file formal written complaints and conduct formal 
hearings thereon, subpoena witnesses and documents, and make a p  
propriate determinations as to dismissing complaints or disciplining 
The complaint process must be initiated by a written complaint 
which contains detailed charges of misconduct.483 The allegations 
must be served on the accused judge, who is offered an opportunity 
for a formal hearing.484 The proceedings are confidential and the 
Judiciary Law prohibits public disclosure by the Commission of the 
charges served, hearings commenced or related matters unless there 
475. Id. at R. 4(A), (B) (1). 
476. Id. at R. 17 cmt. 
477. Id. at R. 3(E) (3) (b) . 
478. See id. at R. 3(E) (3)-(4). 
479. Id. at R. 11 cmt. 
480. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 473, at 54. 
481. The Commission is designated in the New York State Constitution, which requires 
that four members be judges, at least one be an attorney, and at least two be laypersons. 
N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. VI, 5 22(a), (b) (1) (1961). The Commission elects one of its 
members to be chairperson and appoints an administrator and a clerk. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 41 
(McKinney 2002). 
482. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 44(1). 
483. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 44(1). 
484. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 473, at 9. 
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is a waiver by the accused judge until the case has been concluded and 
a judgment rendered.485 This differs from the Model Rules.48" The 
Commission has broad decisional authority. If it determines that dis- 
ciplinary action is warranted, it may render one of four sanctions: pub- 
lic admonition, public censure, removal of the judge from office, 
retirement for di~ability.~~' It also may issue confidential letters of dis- 
missal and caution despite a dismissal of the complaint.488 By pri- 
vately calling attention to ethical violations which can be avoided in 
the future, the Commission serves an educational function, and is the 
only way by which the Commission may address a judge's conduct 
without making a matter This is similar to the charity com- 
mission's proposed remedial role. 
Since 199 1 the Commission has averaged approximately 1400 
complaints per year.490 Fifty complaints were initiated by the Commis- 
sion upon its own motion in 2000. In 2000,1288 new complaints were 
received. Of these, eighty-four percent were dismissed by the Com- 
mission upon initial review, and 215 investigations were a u t h o r i ~ e d . ~ ~ '  
There were 183 pending investigations from the previous year.492 
This is probably more than would be envisaged in a state-wide chari- 
ties commission.493 The Commission had a budget of $1.9 million in 
2000 with a staff of twenty-seven including six full-time and one part- 
time attorneys,494 substantially more than projected for the charities 
commission. 
The Commission on Judicial Conduct has existed in its present 
form since 1975,495 and its size and caseload are substantially more 
485. N.Y. JUD. LAW 55 44(4), 45. 
486. MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11 (a) (2) (1996). 
487. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 44(7). 
488. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, 5 7000.1 ( I ) ,  .3 (2002); N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 473, at 16. 
489. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 473, at 16. Pursuant to stat- 
ute, the Commission's determinations are filed with the Chief Judge of the Court of A p  
peals. Id. There is a right of appeal to the Court of Appeals. Id. After dismissal of a 
complaint or a letter of conduct, if the behavior continues, the Commission may authorize 
an investigation on a new complaint. Id. 
490. I d  at 1. 
491. I d  at 2. 
492. I d  at 3. 
493. Of the combined 398 investigations from 1999 and 2000, 135 complaints were dis- 
missed outright, 67 complaints were dismissed with letters of dismissal and-caution, 7 com- 
plaints involving 7 judges were closed upon resignation of the judge, 6 complaints 
involving 4 judges were closed upon vacancy of off~ce due to retirement or failure to win 
election, and 36 complaints involving 27 judges resulted in formal charges being author- 
ized. Id. at 3. 
494. Id. at 36. 
495. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. VI, 5 22 (1961). 
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than is envisioned by the charity commission. However, there are sev- 
eral commonalities. The Commission's primary goal is to instill re- 
spect for the judiciary. This is an important need for the nonprofit 
sector. The charity commission will offer a forum for complaints, 
which will be responded to more efficiently than under the current 
system. Both will preserve the confidentiality of the proceedings until 
guilt is established, thereby preserving the reputation of the innocent 
judge, in one case, and a nonprofit organization in the other. The 
confidentiality of the charity commission offers greater leeway to re- 
solve problems and to protect innocent nonprofits. At the Commis- 
sion on Judicial Conduct, the accused is protected from public 
disclosure until the case concludes, which is important as an over- 
whelming number of complaints are d i smis~ed .~"~  One can predict a 
similar result with the proposed charity commissions. A difference is 
that the charity commission as envisaged will be able to engage in 
more proactive resolution of problems. 
C. Charity Commissions as Catalysts of Normative Change of 
Fiducia-ly Behavior 
This proposal will bring a positive change in fiduciary behavior 
through education, publicity, and a change in normative consensus. 
The charity commissions will reach many organizations and their fidu- 
ciaries. Its educational functions and the fear of sanction by the attor- 
ney general will force many organizations on the behavioral margin 
who have been brought to the attention of the commissions to change 
their behavior and governance patterns. Most of these fiduciaries will 
understand their obligations and internalize them.497 In due course, 
new social norms will emerge expressing a higher duty of fiduciary 
expectations. The charity commissions will encourage adherence to 
the social norm of following fiduciary rules by increasing the possibil- 
ity of enforcement and extending the reach, though indirectly, of gov- 
ernment investigation. Under Professor Sunstein's model, the 
attorney general will be a "norm entrepreneu?" who may encourage a 
'6 norm bandwagon," that is a rapid and significant change in behav- 
i ~ r . ~ " '  Other norms scholars have "observed that the government may 
496. N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 44-45. 
497. CJ Cooter, Expressive Law L3 Economics, supra note 177, at 585-86 (explaining that 
people tend to internalize sanctions imposed by law as moral values). 
498. Sunstein, Social Nonns and Social Roles, supra note 177, at 909 (defining "norm entre- 
pfeneun" as "people interested in changing social norms" and "norm bandwagons" as "small 
shifts [in norms] lead[ing], to large ones"). 
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be able to enhance compliance with the [new] law by changing or 
exploiting social norms rather than tinkering with  sanction^."^"^ 
One area where the charity commissions could encourage new 
norms involves conflicts of interest. The commissions could en- 
courage fiduciaries to establish conflict of interest policies, to sanitize 
interested transactions by requiring full, not material disclosure, and 
by encouraging nonprofits not to include the interested directors or 
officers for voting or quorum purposes. This could be achieved in a 
simpler, less expensive, and more effective way than the intermediate 
sanctions legislation. First, the organizations brought before the com- 
missions would be taught, encouraged, or sanctioned to obey these 
norms. Second, cumulative reporting of the commissions' actions 
would give publicity to the new approach to conflicts of interest. Most 
desire to live up to the norms of society, but they have to know what 
they are. Publicity generated by the charity commissions will sign* 
the seriousness of fiduciary breaches. The passive nature of board ser- 
vice and the casual attitude toward interested transactions will become 
things of the past as a new norm will have wide acceptance."' 
The proposed charities commissions offer an effective and effi- 
cient method of increasing resources of state regulators at a minimum 
cost. If successful, the charity commissions will signal that they are not 
principally enforcement arms but remedial bodies which will build 
trust and encourage people to report serious problems. They provide 
a channel for citizen action resulting from increased transparency 
provided by the internet. They will leverage the enforcement capacity 
of the attorney general and return the focus of regulation to a more 
local level involving interested citizens. Because of their breadth of 
remedial powers, charity commissions can educate charities and re- 
solve minor problems. They offer a partnership between the non- 
profit community and regulators, which avoids the problems of 
industry self-regulation that so often turns into self-protection. Ac- 
cordingly, charity commissions can effectively restore the reputation 
of the nonprofit sector. 
499. Posner, Tax Compliance, supra note 178, at 1818 (citing to Lessig, supra note 177, at 
960; Kahan, supra note 214, at 607; Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 177, at 
916). 
500. The publication of the names of directors or of organizations might have a greater 
deterrence factor, but its stigmatizing effect would harm the organization and become 
counterproductive because individuals might not want to serve on boards and might hesi- 
tate to report potential abuses. 
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